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 It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a 
signifi cant national security preoccupation. This occurred primarily 
due to four circumstances, all of which occurred within a short span of 
years. The fi rst, beginning around 1990 and repeated many times in the 
years that followed, was the offi cial U.S. Government suggestion that 
proliferation of offensive BW programs among states and even “nonstate 
actors”—terrorist groups—was an increasing trend. The second was 
the discovery, between 1989 and 1992, that the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) had violated the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) since its ratifi cation in 1975 and had built a massive covert 
biological weapons program, the largest the world had ever seen. The 
third was the corroboration by the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) in 1995 that Iraq had maintained a covert biological weapons 
program since 1974, and had produced and stockpiled large quantities 
of agents and delivery systems between 1988 and 1991. The last was the 
discovery, also in 1995, that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which 
had carried out the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, also 
had spent 4 years attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to produce and 
disperse two pathogenic biological agents. 
 The events of September 11, 2001, although not in any way related 
to BW, combined with the distribution of professionally prepared 
anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards, 
magnifi ed previous concerns by orders of magnitude. In December 2002, 
after U.S. forces had overrun much of the territory of Afghanistan, it was 
discovered that the al-Qaida organization also had spent several years 
trying to obtain the knowledge and means to produce biological agents. 
These new factors shifted the context in which BW was considered 
almost entirely to “bioterrorism.” Within 4 years, almost $30 billion in 
federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat. 
This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis. 
The purpose of this monograph is to begin to fi ll that gap.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute 

SUMMARY
 This monograph is comprised of six substantive sections. An 
opening introductory section sets the global context in which the 
threat of “bioterrorism” should be placed. It briefl y surveys other 
nonmilitary challenges to national and global security that the United 
States and other nations currently face, and will face in the coming 
decades. It does so, where possible, by including the mortality levels 
currently resulting from these factors, particularly natural disease 
agents, and the levels that can be projected for them. This provides 
a comparative framework within which bioterrorism can more 
properly be assessed.
 The second section, using U.S. Government sources, surveys 
the evolution of offensive state biological weapons programs. This 
demonstrates that offi cial estimates of the number of such programs 
have diminished by between one-fourth and one-third, from a 
peak of some 13 nations in mid-2001. What is known regarding any 
proliferation from these programs is also surveyed, as well as state 
assistance to nonstate actors.
 The third section surveys the evolution of the efforts by nonstate 
actors—terrorist groups—to obtain, develop, and use biological 
agents. The survey covers the entire 20th century, and up to the present 
day, focusing on the last 25 years. The efforts by the two groups which 
involved the most serious attempts to produce biological agents, the 
Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group between 1990-94 and the al-Qaida 
organization in Afghanistan between 1997-98 and December 2001, 
are reviewed in detail. Using information provided by declassifi ed 
documents, as well as information from other sources, this section 
provides as detailed an examination as is available of the BW efforts 
of the al-Qaida organization. 
 The Japanese Aum group did not succeed in obtaining virulent 
strains of pathogens, nor was it apparently capable of working 
successfully with the strains that it did have. The al-Qaida group 
also appears not to have been able to obtain pathogens, nor to have 




 As the most signifi cant examples available, these highlight all the 
more the unique character of the anthrax postal mailings in the fall 
of 2001 in the United States. The quality of the material that was 
distributed demonstrates the dangerous possibilities that could be 
achieved. However, until the perpetrator is identifi ed, and unless 
it becomes possible to exclude any links with the U.S. biodefense 
program, it remains impossible to assess the relevance of this event 
as an indicator of what might be expected from international terrorist 
organizations.
 The fourth section reviews the public portrayal of the BW 
threat by U.S. offi cials. It includes a review of offi cial and unoffi cial 
exercise scenarios that have been carried out in the past half-dozen 
years, as well as recommended planning scenarios proposed by U.S. 
Government agencies. It includes a very detailed examination of 
several of these scenarios. Many of the exercises are predicated on 
the repeated use of the aerosolized pathogens which produce plague 
and smallpox. These pathogens are not easy to obtain, and they are 
relatively diffi cult to work with. Producing aerosolized formulations 
of them is far beyond the current or near-term capabilities of any 
identifi ed international terrorist group.
 The fi fth and fi nal section discusses the impact of the U.S. 
biodefense research program on the possible future development 
of biological weapons. A signifi cant issue is the interaction of 
constraints and limitations imposed by the terms of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, an international treaty which the U.S. 
Government was instrumental in bringing about, and the greatly 
expanded U.S. biodefense research program already in progress and 
set out in planning documents for the near future. The current lack of 
departmental and government-wide oversight over these programs 
is noted.





 Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 
on January 27, 2005, U.S. Senate Majority Leader William Frist stated 
that “The greatest existential threat we have in the world today is 
biological.” He added the prediction that “an inevitable bio-terror 
attack” would come “at some time in the next 10 years.”1 He was 
seconded by Dr. Tara O’Toole, head of the Center for Biosecurity at 
the University of Pittsburgh: “This [bioterrorism] is one of the most 
pressing problems we have on the planet today.”2
 Are these statements realistic?
 Are they even proximately realistic?
 By way of the most cursory comparison, one can set potential 
bioterrorism against:
 • Global climate change, which could affect populations in every 
corner of the globe, alter the current growth cycles of food 
crops that have evolved over millennia, and consequently 
food production;3
 • Ocean quality deterioration, deforestation, desertifi cation, 
depletion of fresh-water aquifers—all of these are also global 
in impact;4
 • The complex of global population growth, food production, 
energy and other resource constraints, and the waste 
products—solid, liquid and gaseous—produced by human 
society and the impact of these on regional and global 
ecosystems;
 • Between 224.5 and 236 million people died in the 20th century 
in wars and confl ict—say, roughly 230 million.5 This early in 
the 21st century, it is impossible to say whether the harvest of 
confl ict-related deaths will be any different in the 21st century 
than it was in the 20th century.
 • If one adds deaths due to poverty, the fi gures become 
astronomical. Jeffrey Sachs currently estimates this sum 
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worldwide at 20,000 people per day, or 7.3 million per year, 
approximately 75 million over a 10-year period.6 Some portion 
of the deaths that Sachs counts may be due to treatable disease: 
these are discussed separately below. 
 • A working group convened by the Strategic Assessments 
Group of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
RAND Corporation in September 2004 listed 10 “future 
national security threats . . . to the United States” looking 
ahead to 2020. Of the 10, one was “proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD)” and a second was “new health 
threats, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).” 
There was no mention of the use of biological weapons by a 
terrorist group.7
 • Turning to the 1999 Millennium Project list of “The 15 Global 
Challenges We Face at the Millennium,” only 1 of the 15 dealt 
with disease agents: “What can be done to reduce the threat of 
new and reemerging diseases, and the increasing number of 
immune micro-organisms.” It did not include consideration 
of “bio-terrorism” at all.8
 • No attempt is made in this monograph to draw parallels—
or to attempt a comparison of relative risk or potential 
consequences—between the prospect of “bioterrorism” and 
cyberterrorism.9 This is despite the fact that hundreds of 
attacks on U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) computers 
and on national infrastructure targets take place every day 
of the year, and that numerous successful penetrations have 
occurred. Available data a full decade ago indicated that as 
many as 250,000 attacks on DoD computers took place in 
1995. A 1996 Government Accountability offi ce (GAO) report 
characterized 65 percent of them as “successful.”10
 • Within a 10-day period between April 6 and April 16, 2005, no 
fewer than fi ve other competitors were announced as being 
the most dire threat faced by nations:
  — nuclear terrorism;11
  — 640 million small arms and light weapons around the 
world, which are responsible for an estimated 300,000 
deaths per year;12
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  — a terrorist attack using high explosives aimed at cooling 
ponds holding stored irradiated nuclear reactor rods 
at civil nuclear power plants, leading to reactor core 
meltdown and radiation release analogous to the 
Chernobyl reactor disaster;13
  — the possibility of impact of an asteroid with the earth;14
and
  — a missile attack that would detonate a nuclear explosive 
over the United States producing an Electromagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) “. . . that could come not only from terrorist 
organizations like al Queda but from rogue nations such 
as Iran or North Korea.”15
To complete the picture, Rogelio Pfi rter, Director General of the 
United Nations Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap-
ons, stated, perhaps unsurprisingly, that “. . . chemical terrorism has 
been identifi ed in different regions of the world as the number one 
potential threat.”16
 If one looks only at disease and other human public health 
concerns, we see the following:
 • Three diseases alone—malaria, tuberculosis, and human 
immuno-defi ciency virus/acquired immune defi ciency 
syndrome (HIV/AIDS)—kill 5 million people globally year in, 
year out. In 2004, that sum reportedly reached 6 million.17 In 1 
decade, that is 50 million dead. And although the contribution 
of HIV/AIDS to this sum is more recent, the overall total 
has apparently been roughly the same for many years past. 
Projected HIV/AIDS mortality estimates are available for 
the decade to come, and will very likely produce another 50 
million dead due to these three diseases. Falciparium malaria 
is estimated to currently infect 515 million people worldwide, 
with 2.2 billion people—one out of every three people in the 
world—at risk of infection. The cost of malaria to the economy 
of African nations alone is estimated at $12 billion per year.18
Malaria is preventable or treatable. Tuberculosis currently 
infects nearly 1 billion people, and 1 billion new cases are 
anticipated by 2020, 35 million of whom will die. 
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The direct impact on the United States of global infectious disease 
was recognized by the U.S. Government in 1996 by the establishment 
of “. . . a national policy to address the threat of emerging infectious 
diseases through improved domestic and international surveillance, 
prevention, and response measures,” and a standing Task Force in 
the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to coordinate 
those efforts,19 and by a January 2000 National Intelligence Estimate 
titled The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the 
United States.20
 • Diarrheal diseases kill 3.5 million people per year. Most are 
preventable. The number can be considered more or less 
constant over many years, and would mean roughly 35 million 
dead over a period of 10 years.21
 • When the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control—a 
global anti-tobacco treaty—came into effect on February 27, 
2005, World Health Organization (WHO) authorities stated 
that smoking kills 13,500 people per day, or 5 million people 
per year.22 That is another 50 million people every 10 years. 
The world has an estimated 1.2 billion smokers, and notably 
the United States (and China) are among the treaty signatories 
that have, however, not ratifi ed it. In this sum are 500,000 
deaths per year due to smoking in European Union (EU) 
countries, and probably an additional half to two-thirds that 
number in Russia.
 • On March 4, 2005, WHO announced that measles mortality 
had dropped from 873,000 in 1999 to 530,000 in 2003.23 That 
amounts to 3.6 million dead in the past 5 years. As measles 
mortality was over 1 million children alone per year “as 
recently as a decade ago,” that would mean around 10 million 
for the decade 1989 to 1999, and the same for preceding 
decades. (In early 2005, the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) Doctors Without Borders, claimed that measles was 
still “killing nearly a million children every year.”)24 Almost 
all nonimmune children will contract measles if exposed to 
the virus. The measles vaccine has been available for 40 years. 
Immunization costs U.S. $0.30 per vaccination.
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 • Between the 22 years from 1977 to 1999, fl u killed 788,000 
people in the United States, an average of 36,000 people per 
year.25 Even if there is no outbreak of pandemic fl u, one can 
project another 360,000 fl u-related deaths in the United States 
alone in the coming decade. 











 • WHO offi cials have been warning for years of the imminence 
of a pandemic fl u outbreak. They have warned that the 
pandemic was “almost inevitable,” and long overdue.26 There 
were three infl uenza pandemics in the 20th century. The worst 
was the 1918-19 “Spanish fl u.” Estimates of the mortality it 
caused range from a low of 20 million to higher estimates of 
over 50 million worldwide and even 100 million.27 The Asian 
fl u of 1957-58 killed about 1 million people globally, while 
the third fl u pandemic, the 1968-79 Hong Kong fl u, killed an 
estimated 1-4 million people.28
Flu pandemics usually occur about every 20 to 30 years, and it has 
now been 40 years since the last one. The H5N1 avian fl u strain, which 
fi rst appeared in the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak, is still believed to 
be generally incapable of person-to-person transmission. Until very 
recently, the human lethality of the H5N1 strain was considered to 
be approximately 50 percent of those infected. However, it is now 
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understood that the actual incidence of infection is substantially 
higher, due to cases that produce atypical symptoms or do not show 
any symptoms at all, as well as because of underreporting from 
affected countries such as Laos, Cambodia, and China.29 While this 
happily means that lethality is actually lower than 50 percent, it also 
means that the chance of recombination to a human-transmissible 
variant is very much higher, since a much larger population is being 
infected. 
What has been feared for the past half-dozen years is the 
recombination of the H5N1 avian fl u in a person or animal 
simultaneously infected with a human fl u strain, so that the 
recombinant would acquire the ability to be spread from person to 
person. Such a recombinant strain would display the lethality of the 
strain that caused the 1918 to 1921 fl u pandemic which killed tens of 
millions worldwide. On February 23, 2005, the WHO Asia Director 
stated that “The world is now in the gravest possible danger of a 
pandemic.”30 Dr. Julie Gerberding, head of the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, told a meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science 2 days earlier that avian 
fl u poses the single biggest threat to the world at present, the “most 
important threat that we are facing right now.”31 Even Dr. Anthony 
Fauci, Director of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, has fi nally discovered the seriousness of pandemic fl u. Dr. 
Fauci, who in recent years made bioterrorism his main preoccupation 
and the subject of many public statements, acknowledged on 
February 28, 2005, that “the possibility of an infl uenza pandemic . . . 
is a greater threat today than bioterrorism.”32 On March 21, 2005, Dr. 
Fauci presented the keynote address at the 2005 Bio Defense Research 
Meeting of the American Society for Microbiology. His address was 
titled “Infl uenza and Bird Flu: The Ultimate Threats.”33
At the end of May 2005, Dr. Peter Cordingly, the WHO Regional 
Coordinator for Asia, stated that analyses of fl u transmission in the 
preceding months had led to “strong suspicions that person-to-person 
transmission had taken place in two foci, one in Vietnam and one in 
Thailand,” and possibly a third in Cambodia. The H5N1 strain was 
continuing to evolve. “It’s learning to live in the human house, and 
that is potentially very worrying.” The fatality rate also continues to 
drop, and there is confi rmed evidence of asymptomatic infection.34
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Cordingly added that on the basis of the timeline demonstrated in 
the 1957-58 outbreak, the pandemic could begin within 6 months 
of demonstration of sustained person-to-person transmission.35 In 
recent Senate testimony, Dr. Craig Venter suggested that “outbreaks 
and spread of avian and other fl u virus strains . . . could potentially 
kill hundreds of millions and wreak havoc with our global health 
system.”36 Dr. Venter may have had advance notice of the report of the 
Global Task Force for Infl uenza, which appeared in the May 26, 2005, 
issue of Nature. This report predicted that 20 percent of the world’s 
population would be infected in a fl u pandemic, but estimated that 
perhaps only 7.5 million people would die.37 Writing in the special 
issue of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 2005, Dr. Michael Osterholm 
extrapolated estimates of the 1917-18 pandemic fl u mortality to the 
current world population and arrived at 180 to 360 million deaths.38
However, the U.S. Fiscal Year 2006 budget is to provide $4.2 billion 
to the Department of Health and Human Services for biodefense 
programs, $1.76 billion of which will go to NIH for biodefense 
research. At the same time, NIH will only be spending $120 million—
less than one-tenth as much—for work on infl uenza.39 Imagine, in 
the current climate, what the reaction of the U.S. Administration, 
Congress, the media, and bioterrorism publicists would be if an 
agency were predicting with near certainty that “bioterrorists” 
were “about to launch a biological weapons attack that would kill 
somewhere between 10 and 100 million people, perhaps more.”40
 • On March 1, 2005, 758 microbiologists sent an open letter 
to NIH Director Elias Zerhouni criticizing NIH expenditure 
priorities which greatly favored research grant funds for the 
“select agent” pathogens of particular interest to biodefense. 
The supplementary materials that accompanied the letter 
included a brief discussion of the spread of antibiotic resistance 
to major human pathogens:
The 2003 National Academy of Sciences report “Microbial Threats 
to Health” warned that “The world is facing an imminent crisis 
in the control of infectious diseases as the result of a gradual but 
steady increase in the resistance of a number of microbial agents 
to available therapeutic drugs,” and recommended that “The 
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure 
the formulation and implementation of a national strategy for 
developing new antimicrobials.”
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These threats are posed by bacterial agents now established in 
human populations. Tuberculosis is in global resurgence. The 
World Health Organization projects that there will be more 
than 10 million new cases of tuberculosis in 2005 and that 
there will be nearly 1 billion new infected people by 2020, 200 
million of whom will become seriously ill, and 35 million of 
whom will die. Additional threats are posed by other bacterial 
agents, including the agents responsible for salmonellosis, 
shigellosis, borreliosis, legionellosis, ehrlichiosis, pertussis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, meningococcal infections, 
and staphylococcal infections. For each of these agents, strains 
resistant to multiple current antibiotics have emerged, and 
strains resistant to all current antibiotics have emerged or are 
expected soon to emerge.41
 In all of the above, which has been by way of introduction, two 
groups of global problems faced by humankind are listed. The second 
group enumerates only a few pathogen and public-health problems, 
with an annual mortality of above 11 million people per year. So, 
is bioterrorism “the greatest existential threat we have in the world 
today”? And is it “one of the most pressing problems we have on the 
planet today”?
 No. Absolutely not. That is clearly demonstrated by the above 
examples.
 A 2003 report for the Century Foundation nevertheless noted, that 
the 2001 “Amerithrax” events demonstrated that “. . . bioterrorism 
could have an uncertain, far reaching, and potentially devastating 
impact.”42 The statement that the release of a biological pathogen 
by a terrorist group should be considered as an occurrence of “low 
probability but high impact” is correct, but only with important 
qualifi cations. It does not mean any release of any agent formulation 
under any circumstances. Rather, it presumes the release of a 
very high quality product, effi ciently distributed under optimum 
conditions. Later sections of this monograph return to this question 
in more detail.
 There were repeated statements in 1999, most prominently 
in the September 1999 GAO report, Combating Terrorism: Need for 
Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessment of Chemical and Biological 
Attacks, that no threat analysis of this subject—an examination of 
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specifi c potential actors, their capabilities and intentions, and poten-
tial feasibilities—had ever been prepared inside the U.S. Govern-
ment.43 U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) reports 
for several years afterwards indicated that this situation had not 
changed. The task in this monograph is—in brief—to provide an 
evaluation of the overall problem, including several aspects rarely 
considered as being themselves contributions to the threat. This will 
be done by examining the following subjects:
 • The evolution of state biological weapons programs.
 • The evolution of nonstate actors (“terrorist”) biological 
weapon capabilities.
 • Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public 
perceptions and policy prescriptions.
 • Costs and consequences of the U.S. biodefense research and 
development (R&D) program.
 A threat assessment of the potential for the use of biological agents 
by terrorist groups is a very different exercise than that customarily 
faced in providing military threat assessments. No one ever did a 
threat assessment of a Soviet T-34 tank, the Galosh antiballistic missile 
(ABM) system that encircled Moscow, or an Akula-class nuclear 
attack submarine (SSN) without those systems actually existing. 
Declassifi cation of historical intelligence estimates of the capabilities 
of forces and weapon systems that U.S. forces might have confronted 
have certainly provided examples of inaccurate evaluations.44
Nevertheless, performance characteristics and capabilities were 
often reasonably well known. Threat estimation of potential 
bioterrorism is as different as possibly can be from the assessment 
of a real operational system. It is almost purely hypothetical, and 
rarely, if ever, is predicated on a specifi c identifi able group and its 
capabilities. The range of possible assumptions is enormous, the 
utilization of extreme worst-case assumptions is the rule, and these 
universally depend on the projection of capabilities into the future, 




THE EVOLUTION OF STATE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
PROGRAMS
 Information derived solely from offi cial U.S., Russian, and United 
Kingdom (UK) sources has been available since 1988 which specifi es 
how many and which nations maintain offensive biological weapon 
programs. Offi cial U.S. Government statements repeated for many 
years that there had been four nations in possession of offensive 
biological weapons programs in 1972 at the time of the signing of 
the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC), and that this 
number had increased to ten by 1989. (See Table 1.) In November 
1997, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA), in the course of a statement to BTWC negotiating states in 
Geneva, increased the U.S. estimate to 12 nations. The additional two 
states have never been identifi ed by U.S. offi cials. In July 2001, a U.S. 
Government offi cial stated that 13 countries had offensive biological 
weapons (BW) programs.45
 There has been no equivalent statement or revised estimate since. 
All through the 1990s, it was common—in fact, nearly universal—
for commentators to depict the proliferation of state BW programs 
as a constantly increasing trend. For example, Ambassador Donald 
Mahley, the senior U.S. diplomat to all multilateral negotiations 
in Geneva concerning chemical and biological weapons, stated in 
an October 1996 Voice of America broadcast that “It is estimated 
that over the last several years, the number of countries suspected 
of having a biological weapons capability has risen.”46 However, 
it seems very possible that it may have been a more or less stable 
constant for the last 20 years. Moreover there were several notable 
reductions or deletions from the list in the past decade. Since the 
overall total was not very large to begin with, that would be a very 
signifi cant reduction: 
 • The BW program of South Africa was terminated by 1995.47
 • On November 1, 2002, U.S. Undersecretary of State John 
Bolton stated that “Libya has an offensive BW program in 
the research and development stage, and it may currently be 
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capable of producing small quantities of biological agents.”48
The statement was consistent with other U.S. statements 
regarding Libya and BW during the preceding decade. The 
phrasing in the 1993 report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service was substantially stronger, stating that “There is 
information that Libya is engaged in initial testing in the 
area of biological weapons.”49 At the end of 2003, U.S. and 
UK government teams working in Libya ascertained that 
Libya had never had an offensive BW program. In the words 
of a U.S. administration briefer, “Libya acknowledged past 
intentions to acquire equipment and develop capabilities 
related to Biological Weapons.” Libya additionally 
“committed not to pursue a biological weapons program and 
to accept the necessary inspections and monitoring to verify 
that understanding.”50 Apparently Libya may at some point 
have either procured or investigated the procurement of 
dual-use equipment that might have served such a program, 
information which had been picked up by intelligence. This 
experience demonstrates a weakness in judgments based on 
procurement monitoring. It can be a useful indicator, but it 
cannot be considered defi nitive.51
 • It is now clear that under the pressure of UNSCOM 
inspections, the BW program of Iraq was disbanded between 
1992 and 1995.52 Unfortunately, the Iraqi program provided 
two other lessons. First, as shown by the period 1985 to 1990, 
an offensive BW program can be hidden for quite a number 
of years, including during the period in which it initiates 
production. Second, as demonstrated in precisely the opposite 
direction by the period 1998 to 2002, the most basic errors in 
judgment can be made by Western intelligence agencies.53
In addition, further public political manipulation of those 
mistaken judgments by political elites can take place.
 • In 2004, the present U.S. administration also withdrew the 
charge that Cuba maintained an offensive BW program.54
 • Given the continued total denial by the Russian government 
of international access to the BW facilities of the Ministry of 
Defense of Russia (Kirov, Sergeiv Posad, and Yekaterinburg), 
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as well as continued impeded access to relevant facilities of 
the Ministry of Health, it is impossible to be certain of the 
status of BW-related activities in Russia. Nevertheless, they 




















Middle East   
Iraq X X
Libya X X X
Syria X X
Iran X X X
Egypt X
South/East Asia   
China X X




Africa   
South Africa X
Russia Ambiguity regarding continuation of offensive program dating from the USSR
1: “Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before 
the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee on Intelligence Issues,” March 14, 1990, p. 54; “Statement of Rear Admiral William 
O. Studeman, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical 
Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues,” March 
1, 1988, p. 48; “Statement of Admiral C. A. H. Trost, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget of the United 
States Navy,” February 28, 1990; “Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Dick Cheney, 
Secretary of Defense, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, June 11, 1990,” 
News Release, No. 294-90, p. 4.
2: Proliferation Issues: A New Challenge After the Cold War, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Report (translation), JPRS-TND-9-3-007, 
March 5, 1993.
Table 1. Nations Having BW Programs 
at Least Approaching Weaponization.
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This would mean an absolute reduction by four states—South Africa, 
Libya, Iraq, and Cuba—roughly one-third or one-fourth of the total 
number of states that, according to the U.S. Government, maintain 
offensive BW programs.
 In addition, the status of several of the other national BW programs 
appears to be less certain than previously implied. If one looks at a 
recent public Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment of the 
BW programs of Iran, North Korea, and Syria, it reads as follows:
 Iran: Biological. Even though Iran is part of the BTWC, Tehran 
probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued 
to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise 
that could be used in Tehran’s BW program. Iran probably has the 
capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents.
 North Korea: Biological. North Korea has acceded to the 
BTWC but nonetheless has pursued BW capabilities since the 
1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, 
supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North 
Korea’s BW program. North Korea is believed to possess a 
munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed 
it to weaponize BW agents and may have some such weapons 
available for use.
 Syria. Chemical and Biological. Syria probably also continued 
to develop a BW capability.55
A sentence on North Korea by CIA Director Porter Goss on March 
17, 2005, was somewhat stronger: “We believe North Korea has 
active chemical weapons (CW) and BW programs and probably has 
chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for use.”56
 By political agreement among the States Parties to the BTWC, 
Confi dence Building Measures (CBM) were to be submitted 
annually, beginning in 1987. Iran did not submit any until 1998 
and 1999, and when they did, they conveniently “forgot” to submit 
perhaps the two most critical CBM forms out of eight. These were the 
declarations that require the state to list national biological defense 
research and development programs (Form A2) and past activities 
in offensive/defense biological research and development programs 
(Form F). In 2002, Iran declared that it “did not and does not have 
any national, subnational or individual programs/activities and/or 
facilities related to biological offensive purposes” and that it “did 
15
not and does not have any ‘National Biological Defensive Program’. 
However the state has carried out some defensive studies on 
identifi cation, decontamination, protection, and treatment against 
some agents and toxins.”57 Offi cial U.S. statements regarding the 
Iranian BW program from 2001 onward reduced its apparent status 
compared to assessments that had been offered in the late 1990s. 
Reference to agent and weapon stocks disappeared. During President 
George W. Bush’s fi rst term, the administration submitted only one 
Arms Control Compliance report to Congress, although this report 
is intended by Congress to be an annual submission. It did this in 
its fi rst year in offi ce,58 and there has not been another one since. It 
therefore remains to be seen how the Iranian BW program will be 
described in any forthcoming version. 
 It is useful to recall a statement in 1999 by Dr. John A. Lauder, 
then the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for 
Nonproliferation:
Intelligence is all about ascertaining not only the capabilities, but also the 
intentions of one’s adversaries. Because of the dual utility of the technology 
and expertise involved, the actual CBW threat is in fact directly tied to 
intentions. Getting at this intent is the hardest thing for intelligence to 
do, but it is essential if we are to determine with certainty the scope and 
nature of the global biological and chemical weapons threat.59
 U.S. Government offi cials have never explained what the 
word “capability” means in these statements: whether it means 
the procurement of dual-use biotechnology equipment, a national 
pharmaceutical production capacity, a dedicated defensive BW 
R&D program, or the identifi cation of dedicated infrastructure for 
offensive BW R&D. It is clear however that after the Iraq weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) intelligence failures demonstrated by the 
reports of the Iraq Survey Group, the U.S. administration decided to 
be much more cautious in the conclusions that it drew from perhaps 
rather ambiguous information.60 Now and then over the previous 
years, one had overheard a comment by a government offi cial or 
former government offi cial to the effect that the evidence regarding 
country X or Y was ambiguous or weak. But that body of relevant 
evidence was never available for examination.61 In 2003, a WMD-
wide review of U.S. assessments was initiated, and the review on the 
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proliferation of BW was headed by Lawrence Gershwin, National 
Intelligence Council offi cer for Science and Technology. This 
apparently led to the readjustment of some previous assessments.62
 In the case of Iran, an unusual opportunity was provided in 
2003 by the presentation in Washington, DC, of detailed allegations 
regarding Iran’s alleged BW program.63 The information was 
provided by the same group that, in some cases, has been the fi rst to 
provide information on Iran’s nuclear weapon complex, information 
that had not been publicly known, nor apparently known by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and which led to 
subsequent international action which forced Iranian government 
disclosures. The BW information was quite detailed, naming 
individuals, institutions, facilities, and locations. However, there has 
never been any comment or corroboration of these allegations by 
the U.S. Government or by any other government or international 
agency. In November 2004, CIA Director Goss reported to Congress 
that Iran continued “to vigorously pursue indigenous programs 
to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.” However, 
in March 2005, a special Presidential panel decried the state of 
knowledge available to the U.S. Government regarding even Iran’s 
nuclear weapon program.64 The U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence is currently reviewing the information available to 
the administration regarding the nuclear, chemical, and biological 
programs of Iran and North Korea. It will be interesting to see if that 
report is made public, and, if so, what it will say in regard to the BW 
programs of these two countries.
 The CIA document containing the assessments of the Iranian, 
North Korean, and Syrian BW programs quoted above is released 
twice a year. Although the analogous paragraphs of the preceding 
half-dozen or so years have not been included here for comparison, 
the above statements are all lower key than they were in earlier years 
in the same report. The caveats are notable: “probably,” “continued 
to seek,” “the capability to,” “would have allowed it to,” “probably 
also continued to develop.” No defi nitive statements of production, 
stockpiling, or the nature of munitions are included.
 As always, there is no discussion of Israel’s BW “capability” or 
the status of its BW program in any public U.S. Government report. 
It is interesting to note, in regard to the comments on proliferation 
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that follow below, that in the only relevant data that appears to be 
available, Israel had the second largest number of visitors to the U.S. 
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) 
following the UK, a country with which the United States shares BW 
relevant information.65
 We know that there was exaggeration of chemical weapon 
proliferation in the past, so this is not a unique experience. In 1990, 
Brad Roberts wrote “We entered the 1980s with three, four, or fi ve 
chemically armed states; we will enter the 1990s with upward of two 
dozen chemically armed states” [my emphasis].66 The estimate of the 
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had 
been somewhat less, saying that “at least 15 states possessed chemical 
weapons, with others attempting to acquire them.” However, on 
January 24, 1989, his successor, General William Burns, told the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that only fi ve or six of 
these countries actually possessed stockpiles of chemical weapons 
in addition to the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR).67
 In August 2005, the U.S. Department of State released its most 
recent version of its “Noncompliance” Report.68 Although nominally 
an annual report, none had been released in 2004. Eight countries 
are discussed in the section dealing with the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. A sentence in the opening introductory 
paragraph of the section states that “the specifi c cases addressed 
here are those that have assumed obligations relevent to the BWC 
and for which the most evidence exists of actual or potential 
noncompliance.” The insertion of the word “potential” would 
seem to substantially undercut the utility of the entire section. A 
country should be considered in compliance with the BWC, or not 
in compliance. Libya is still included as one of the eight nations, 
although previous evidence presented by the current administration 
and discussed earlier would provide no reason for that. Cuba also 
is still present. The discussion of several countries was larded with 
caveats, explicit or implicit. Most problematic was the inclusion of 
general descriptors as suggestive evidence of noncompliance, such 
as work in “advanced biotechnology techniques,” “aerosolization 
techniques,” “legitimate public health and commercial uses [that] 
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could also offer access to . . . BW enabling capabilities,” “the technical 
capability to conduct limited offensive research,” the existence of 
facilities that “could easily hide . . . capabilities for a potential BW 
program.” All of these nonspecifi c indicators could equally apply to 
every NATO ally of the United States, every EU country, to many 
advanced developing nations, and above all, they would be more 
applicable to the United States than to any other country. They are not 
evidence of BWC treaty noncompliance. The use of such descriptors 
will almost certainly place previous U.S. attributions of BWC 
noncompliance in question in the minds of international diplomats 
who have regularly read the analogous BW sections in earlier annual 
U.S. Noncompliance reports. Finally, the 2005 report reinforces the 
conclusion that the trend of BW proliferation has not been increasing 
over the past decades, but that it has either been essentially constant 
or has been decreasing.
 The possibility of proliferation from three of the former or present 
programs—South Africa, Iraq, and Russia—has been raised at times 
by commentators. What is known is as follows.
South Africa. The South African BW program was minimal, 
no more than a handful of researchers were involved. Contrary to 
various press reports in the media, the program did not include 
genetic engineering of pathogens, nor—as best is known—has there 
been any proliferation from the program whatsoever.69
Iraq. There was no known emigration of researchers from the 
former BW program of Iraq. However, the Addendum to the report of 
the Iraq Survey Group released in March 2005 states that “Migration 
of some WMD-associated program personnel to countries like Iran 
or Syria is possible.” The phrasing is ambiguous in that it cannot be 
deciphered if this is assumed to already have happened, or if it is a 
generic statements suggesting that such migration could take place 
in the future. No disaggregation of “WMD” is provided. The report 
continues: “Since OIF [Operation IRAQI FREEDOM], the ISG [Iraq 
Survey Group] is aware of only one scientist associated with Iraq’s 
pre-1991 WMD program assisting terrorists or insurgents. However, 
there are multiple reports of Iraqis with general chemical or biological 
expertise helping insurgents produce chemical and biological 
agents.”70 Nothing further is said about these “reports,” or whether 
the ISG considered them credible or not. Much more signifi cantly, 
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the Addendum then discusses a list of Iraqi BW scientists prepared in 
early 2002 for the purpose of possible transmission to Syria. However, 
it was not known if the list was or was not ever transmitted to Syria, 
and the ISG did not discover any evidence of emigration of Iraqi BW 
scientists to Syria. 
 The Twentieth Quarterly Report of the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to the UN 
Security Council does raise the possibility that some of the pathogen 
cultures used for Iraq’s BW production program may still remain 
unlocated in Iraq, a consideration that was also raised in the report 
of the U.S. Iraq Survey Group.71
Russia. Again, contrary to undocumented hints that fi nd their 
way into media reports, there is no known evidence of the transfer 
of pathogens from the Soviet or continuing Russian programs to any 
other state, either prior to 1992 or since 1992. Emigration of former 
Soviet BW-related researchers to any proliferant state has been 
minimal. The one known example is the move of 10-12 researchers, 
largely from the institutes belonging to the Russian Academy of 
Sciences rather than from former BW institutes, to Iran. There 
continue to be statements, particularly by Dr. D. A. Henderson and 
the Pittsburgh group, to the effect that the location of Soviet BW 
“stockpiles”—not culture collections—produced in the USSR prior 
to 1990 are not known. U.S. intelligence and defense agencies have 
believed for over a decade that those “stockpiles” were destroyed 
by the USSR roughly between 1988 and 1990, and there are no 
indications that these agencies have ever altered that judgment. 
Contrary statements appear to be deliberately misleading. 
 As late as June 2005 at a seminar at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City, Dr. Henderson said in reference to the 
possible dispersion of smallpox from the USSR or Russia: 
There have been economic problems in the Soviet Union, or now Russia. 
Many of the scientists have left the laboratories. They’ve gone all over 
the world, different places, some in the United States, Europe, some have 
gone to North Korea, Iraq, Iran. So that [is what] the problem is, there is 
just no way of knowing who has what and where, and that’s the concern, 
that there may be others with the virus, but we just can’t fi nd out about 
it.72
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No Soviet or Russian BW scientists are known by the U.S. intelligence 
community to have gone to North Korea or to Iraq. Those few Russian 
scientists that went to Iran did not come from institutes that worked 
with smallpox. The U.S. intelligence community does not believe that 
smallpox virus was transferred from the USSR or Russia to any other 
state, not the three mentioned nor any other. The great majority of 
Russian BW relevant scientists that emigrated did so to the United 
States, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Israel, 
etc., and not to states of BW proliferation concern.
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PART III
EVOLUTION OF NONSTATE ACTOR/TERRORIST
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
 Five extensive databases were published in the 1990s covering 
nearly the entire 20th century, and several of these have been updated 
so as to remain current. It is extremely important to distinguish 
between the seven different categories of BW-related events that they 
cumulatively cover: hoaxes, threats, consideration or discussion of 
use, product tampering, purchase of materials, attacks on facilities, 
attempts to produce biological agents or attempts to use them, and 
actual use.73
These databases were compiled by:
 • Harvey McGeorge, 1994, covering 1945-94;74
 • Ron Purver, 1995, covering 1945-95;75
 • Bruce Hoffman, 1998, covering 1990-98;76
 • Seth Carus, 1999, covering 1990-99, and since updated;77 and,
 • The Monterey Institute, 1999, covering 1990-99, and since 
updated.78
 The conclusions from these independent studies were uniform 
and mutually reinforcing. There is an extremely low incidence of real 
biological (or chemical) events, in contrast to the number of hoaxes, 
the latter spawned by administration and media hype since 1996 
concerning the prospective likelihood and dangers of such events. 
A massive second wave of hoaxes followed the anthrax incidents in 
the United States in October-November 2001, running into global 
totals of tens of thousands. It is also extremely important that 
analysts producing tables of “biological” events not count hoaxes. A 
hoax is not a “biological” event, nor is the word “anthrax” written 
on a slip of paper the same thing as anthrax, or a pathogen, or a 
“demonstration of threat”—all of which various analysts and even 
government advisory groups have counted hoaxes as being on one 
occasion or another.79
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 Those events that were real, and were actual examples of use, 
were overwhelmingly chemical, and even in that category, involved 
the use of easily available, off-the-shelf, nonsynthesized industrial 
products. Many of these were instances of personal murder, and not 
attempts at mass casualty use. The Sands/Monterey compilation 
indicated that exactly one person was killed in the United States in 
the 100 years between 1900 and 2000 as a result of an act of biological 
or chemical terrorism.
 Excluding the preparation of ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively 
easier to prepare, there are only a few recorded instances in the 
years 1900 to 2000 of the preparation or attempted preparation of 
pathogens in a private laboratory by a nonstate actor.
 The signifi cant events to date are:
 • 1984, the Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon, use of salmonella on 
food;
 • 1990-94, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group’s unsuccessful 
attempts to procure, produce and disperse anthrax and 
botulinum toxin;80
 • 1999, November 2001, al-Qaida,81 the unsuccessful early 
efforts to obtain anthrax and to prepare a facility in which to 
do microbiological work;
 • October-November 2001, the successful “Amerithrax” 
distribution of a high-quality dry-powder preparation of 
anthrax spores, which had been prepared within the preceding 
24 months.
 Before discussing the Amerithrax and al-Qaida experiences in 
some further detail, two books, one published and one still in press, 
should be mentioned. These are particularly important because 
they are collections of case studies which, between the two, contain 
detailed reviews of virtually all the groups or individuals who 
have—or who had been alleged to have—prepared or used chemical 
or biological agents. The fi rst of the books is Toxic Terror, edited by 
Jonathan Tucker,82 and the second is the forthcoming Motives, Means 
and Mayhem: Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Unconventional Weapons, 
edited by John Parachini.83 Between them the two books report on 
28 case studies. They demonstrate that several right-wing groups in 
23
the United States produced ricin by extraction from mashed castor 
bean pulp, and that the Rajneesh group did culture the salmonella 
that it obtained. However, there is apparently no other “terrorist” 
group that is known to have successfully cultured any pathogen. It 
is precisely because of the exceptional nature of the Amerithrax case 
that it becomes crucially signifi cant to identify the person or persons 
who made the U.S. anthrax preparation, and to determine whether 
that is the same individual or individuals who prepared and mailed 
the postal envelopes. We will return to this in a moment.
 In advance of the publication of his book, Parachini summarized 
the conclusions from those studies that “provide an empirical 
foundation to assess the motivations, behavior, and patterns related 
to terrorist interest, or alleged interest, in unconventional weapons.”84
Perhaps the most important discovery from the fi rst of the two books 
was that “Upon rigorous inspection, several of the empirical cases 
frequently cited in the media and scholarly literature proved to be 
apocryphal.” Parachini then discusses several factors that appear 
to be most signifi cant in understanding the case studies. He fi nds 
the mindset of the group leaders of the organization, exogenous 
and internal constraints, and a combination of opportunity and 
the technical capacity of the group to be “. . . the factors that most 
signifi cantly infl uence a group’s propensity to seek to acquire and 
to use unconventional weapons.” These conclusions are consistent 
with those made by another highly experienced terrorism specialist, 
Dr. Yoram Schweitzer of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel 
Aviv University. In a recent conference presentation, he enumerated 
four factors which he felt served as inhibitions to the consideration of 
biological weapons within terrorist organizations: state dependency, 
requirements of their own local constituency, requirements of the 
international constituency, and group survival.85
 To the degree that the leadership of a particular terrorist 
organization does not have or escapes from these considerations, 
they may consider the use of biological agents more seriously. This 
may explain why the experience of the Rajneesh, Aum Shinrikyo, 
and al-Qaida groups followed a path different from other terrorist 
groups. Similar conceptions were explored as far back as 1989 in a 
RAND study authored by Dr. Jeffrey Simon.86 This sort of analysis 
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of real cases of the relevant behavior of real terrorist groups, carried 
out by experienced analysts of terrorism, when it is not disregarded 
entirely, is frequently met with disdain by the proselytizers of “the 
bioterrorist threat,” as an example presented later in this monograph 
indicates.
 The extremely brief entry regarding terrorist groups and BW 
and CW capabilities that appeared in the December 2004 report of 
the U.S. National Intelligence Council was again minimalist in its 
description:
Developments in CW and BW agents and the proliferation of related 
expertise will pose a substantial threat, particularly from terrorists, as we 
have noted.
• Given the goal of some terrorist groups to use weapons that can be 
employed surreptitiously and generate dramatic impact, we expect 
to see terrorist use of some readily available biological and chemical 
weapons.87
Since this is a report that was looking ahead to the period between 
2005 and 2020—the next 15 years—the reference to “readily available” 
materials is particularly notable. It harks back to the conclusions 
of the 20th century database studies, and certainly does not seem 
to anticipate efforts at synthesis, genetic engineering, or anything 
beyond the most elementary products. Dr. Stephen Morse predicted 
much the same speaking to a day-long conference convened by the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences in January 2003. Morse previously 
served in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and currently is director of 
the Center for Public Health Preparedness at Columbia University’s 
School of Public Health. In answering his own question “What 
sources would terrorists use,” he stated that “Most are likely to use 
easily obtained materials,” and that “state-sponsored [terrorists] 
might use ‘classical BW’.”88
 The latest U.S. Government intelligence estimates of the BW 
capabilities of terrorist/nonstate actor groups became available in 
February and March 2005. They fi rst appeared in three presentations 
to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 16, 
2005.
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Porter Goss, Director of Central Intelligence: “It may be only a 
matter of time before al-Qaida or another group attempts to 
use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons 
(CBRN).”
Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
“. . . we are concerned that they are seeking weapons of mass 
destruction including chemical weapons, so-called ‘dirty bombs’ 
or some type of biological agent such as anthrax. . . . I am also 
very concerned with the growing body of sensitive reporting 
that continues to show al-Qaida’s clear intention to obtain and 
ultimately use some form of chemical, biological, nuclear or 
high-energy explosives (CBRNE) material in its attacks against 
America.”
Jim Loy, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
“. . . the most severe threats revolve around al-Qaida and its 
affi liates’ long-standing intention to develop, procure, or acquire 
chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear, weapons for 
mass-casualty attacks. Al-Qaida and affi liated elements currently 
have the capability to produce small amounts of crude biological 
toxins and toxic chemical materials, and may have acquired small 
amounts of radioactive materials.”89
On March 17, 2005, it was the turn of Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director 
of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, in a presentation to the U.S. 
Senate Armed Services Committee:
We judge terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaida, [to] remain 
interested in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons. Al-Qaida’s stated intention to conduct an attack exceeding 
the destruction of 9/11 raises the possibility that planned attacks 
may involve unconventional weapons. There is little doubt it has 
contemplated using radiological or nuclear material. The question 
is whether al-Qaida has the capability. Because they are easier to 
employ, we believe terrorists are more likely to use biological agents 
such as ricin or botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals to cause 
casualties and attack the psyche of the targeted populations.90
CIA Director Porter Goss made a presentation to the Committee as 
well, and repeated the exact wording of his February 16 remarks 
quoted above. 
 These rather similar extracts are the only references to nonstate 
actor interest or capability in the CBW area in all the presentations. 
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They are signifi cant for several reasons:
 • No other group than al-Qaida was mentioned.
 • All of the statements are less specifi c, more general, lower 
key, than in the preceding (Tenet) years.
 • In two of the three statements, B is grouped together with C, 
R and N, and in one even with “E” (high-energy explosives), 
making it impossible for someone without prior knowledge 
to know whether there is a specifi c basis for including B.
 • One of the statements refers to “small amounts of crude 
biological toxins” which undoubtedly refers to ricin and not 
to any pathogen.
 • It has been known at least since November 2001, when U.S. 
and UK military forces occupied Afghanistan, that al-Qaida 
had been “seeking . . . anthrax” for 2 or 3 years prior to that 
date. The information therefore concerns al-Qaida activities 
before the fall of Afghanistan, and there is no publicly 
available information to indicate that the group has been able 
to continue their efforts since the end of 2001.
Anthrax is endemic in Afghanistan, and a limited domestic animal 
vaccination program existed in the country. Nevertheless, there were 
undoubtedly some number of animal cases of the disease per year, 
but the group apparently never obtained a pathogenic strain. 
 In addition, all of the four recent specifi c references to al-Qaida-
affi liated groups and ricin have turned out to be spurious. When the 
Al Ansar camp in Northeast Iraq, “Kermal,” was overrun by U.S. 
military forces, sampling showed no presence whatsoever of ricin, 
nor of materials for its preparation. (In fact, the camp lacked running 
water.) Before the invasion, there had been several statements by 
U.S. Government and military offi cials stating that the group was 
preparing ricin in the camp. As late as the Vice Presidential debate on 
October 5, 2004, U.S. Vice President Cheney, referring to Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, said, “He set up shop in Baghdad, where he oversaw the 
poisons facility up at Kermal, where the terrorists were developing 
ricin and other deadly substances to use.”91 Since this remark was 
made long after the U.S. Government knew that the camp had 
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contained no ricin, Cheney’s statement has to be considered either 
ignorance or fabrication. There is no mention whatsoever of the Al 
Ansar camp in the report of the Iraq Survey Group. 
 Individuals arrested by French police did not have any ricin nor 
had they prepared any; they had only “planned to” produce ricin. The 
“chemicals” that the group had was apparently sodium cyanide.
 The “plots” in the spring of 2003 by a group associated with 
Abu Musab Zarqawi in Jordan reportedly again involved sodium 
cyanide, and not ricin. (Since Jordanian authorities have referred to 
the planned use of 20 tons of high explosives in the planned event, 
there is every reason to assume that the cyanide would have been 
destroyed in any such massive high explosives blast.)
 The London case is the last, and it is interesting to look at it in 
some detail. The group, arrested in Wood Green, London, was in 
possession of 22 castor bean seeds. Their equipment was a coffee 
grinder, “. . . with a brown residue” (probably of coffee), a mortar 
and pestle, and a hand-written recipe taken off the internet at an 
internet café and transcribed into Arabic. The recipe was a derivative 
of the Maxwell Hutchkinson recipe in the notorious The Poisoner’s 
Handbook sold in thousands of copies at U.S. gun shows, a recipe that 
would very likely not produce ricin or extremely little of it.
 The fi rst tests for ricin in the London apartment were done by a 
fi eld test kit and apparently registered positive. Within 2 days, 20 
more specifi c tests were carried out at the British Defense Science 
Technology Laboratory, Porton Down, resulting in 17 “negatives” 
and three false positives. However the task of informing the London 
Metropolitan Police fell to another Porton staffer with public liaison 
responsibilities, who apparently either did not understand or 
confused the information that he was to relay, with the result that he 
phoned the press and police, saying that “traces of ricin” had been 
found.92 His actions were later attributed to “incompetence.” Despite 
this, as late as mid-February 2005, an offi cial UN investigative group 
reported to the UN Security Council that “al-Qaida-associated groups 
in both the United Kingdom and Jordan came close to mounting 
such [C, B, R, or N] attacks. It seems only a matter of time before 
a successful chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack 
occurs.” (All four at once!)93 All of the above is incorrect. No ricin was 
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found. Whether the UK Metropolitan Police ever announced a public 
correction in 2003 is not known. It is unfortunate that misinformation 
of this sort found its way into a UN document. 
 Scientists at Porton Down subsequently followed the Hutchkinson 
recipe as an experiment. It produced suffi cient ricin to kill one person 
if the total quantity would have been injected into a person. If eaten, it 
was suffi cient to have caused vomiting and abdominal pain. If applied 
to doorknobs to act as a contact poison, it would have had no effect 
at all.94 Three other “recipes” were found with this ricin “recipe”: a 
“rotten meat poison” to be prepared by mixing “corn fl our, meat, 
dung, and dust together in a can,” a “recipe” for “cyanide poison” 
to be obtained by boiling many thousands of ground apple seeds, 
and a “potato poison” of equal inutility.95 However, Peter Clarke, 
the head of Britain’s antiterrorist police branch, described the poison 
plot as being “highly serious,” while Nigel Sweeney, the prosecutor, 
said “These were no playtime recipes. These are recipes that experts 
give credence to and experiments show work. They are scientifi cally 
viable and potentially deadly.”96 Both statements are clearly wrong, 
and there is no reason that law enforcement offi cials anywhere in 
the world should be able to do their work without inaccurate and 
sensationalist comments.
 As for the “Encyclopedia of Jihad,” in which such rudimentary 
and often inadequate recipes are supposedly located, it is not clear 
when it was composed. One suggestion is that its origin goes back to 
the 1978-88 period of Afghan resistance to the USSR, which would 
be as much as 10 years before al-Qaida came into existence. A second 
suggestion is that it is an agglomeration that grew over the years, 
with material successively added to it, materials on toxin production 
being added in later years. Although the “Encyclopedia” is routinely 
attributed to al-Qaida, it therefore may rather have been inherited, 
or adopted, by the group. 
Al-Qaida BW Efforts in Afghanistan: 1997-98 to 2001.
 When we move to the al-Qaida group in Afghanistan, the 
picture rapidly becomes much more serious, and all the preceding 
semi-farcical events can be seen as inconsequential trivia. The fi rst 
signifi cant and meaningful information on what al-Qaida may have 
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hoped at some point to achieve in the area of BW appeared in a 
single page in the journal Science in mid-December 2003,97 and then 
in declassifi ed documentary materials that were obtained in the last 
week of March 2004. Appended to the single page in Science by a 
computer link was a list of 32 items: 11 books and 21 professional 
journal papers nearly all dating from the 1950s and 1960s dealing 
with pathogens or with BW. These were found in an al-Qaida training 
camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 2001.98 Half of the 
books dealt with historical or general aspects of BW and would be of 
little operational utility to an effort to produce BW agents. However, 
at least some of the journal papers and the remaining half of the 
books could be useful for such an effort. A note in the Science paper 
identifi ed these as the documents referred to by CIA Director Tenet 
in his February 2002 Senate testimony quoted below. They were 
found only a few kilometers from the site near Kandahar airport 
which contained the rudimentary equipment also procured by al-
Qaida. 
 Most important of all, the documents indicated that “. . . al-Qaida’s 
BW initiative included recruitment of individuals with Ph.D.-level 
expertise who supported planning and acquisition efforts by their 
familiarity with the scientifi c community.” The journal papers 
concerned B. anthracis and Clostridium botulinum, but also Yersinia 
pestis (plague) and Hepatitis A and C. Fragments of two of the 
classifi ed materials were included in the Science article as photocopies 
of handwritten letters. The letterhead of one of them read “Society for 
Applied Microbiology.” The second item reports that the individual 
was not able to obtain a pathogenic culture of anthrax, and that “the 
culture available in [deleted] is nonpathogenic.” The webpage of the 
Society for Applied Microbiology advertises that organization as 
“the UK’s oldest microbiological society.” Another snippet from the 
handwritten letter, which explained that its author would “require 
at least the air ticket expenses,” indicated that the person was fl ying 
either to or from the UK. The letter fragment also explained that “The 
money with me is only to buy strains of vaccines.”
 When the classifi ed documents were obtained, it turned out that 
nearly all of the pages consisted of the journal articles themselves, as 
well as medical handbook excerpts on anthrax, plague, botulinum, 
30
etc.99 There were also many additional pages of references to both 
books and journals, including many standard reference works 
such as the SIPRI volumes on The Problems of Chemical and Biological 
Warfare and the 1969 UN study on chemical and biological weapons. 
It was the remaining 10 pages that were of importance. They were 
two 3-page letters and accompanying handwritten notes suggesting 
the layout of a laboratory and the equipment recommended to outfi t 
it, and “program requirements” including the time needed to train 
whoever was going to work in the laboratory, and that person’s 
assistants. 
 The correspondent already had a Ph.D. It is clear that the author 
of the letter was not a native English speaker, and annotations on 
some of the papers that he sent from England were in Arabic. Yet 
the letters and the accompanying notes were written in English. It 
suggested that either English was the only language that he and 
the recipient shared in common, or it was the preferred language 
for them to use with each other. In fact, the author was a Pakistani 
microbiologist, whose native language would be Dari, and there 
is reason to believe that he was writing to the Egyptian, Dr. al-
Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy. The writer reports visiting 
a BL-3 facility—apparently in the UK—at which time he had been 
shown a pathogen collection. He was not only trying to obtain and 
export pathogen cultures, but he was also seeking to buy vaccines 
for protecting personnel against anthrax infection. He was being 
supplied by al-Qaida with funds with which to buy equipment and 
materials, which he itemized. He had also been attending various 
European conferences dealing with pathogens—or had obtained their 
proceedings—including a conference on anthrax. The latest dates of 
these were in July and September 1999. He had signed his letters, 
named the laboratory that he had visited, and named its laboratory 
director and identifi ed one or two other individuals by name. All 
these identifi cations were deleted in the declassifi ed materials. 
 What the documents indicated was an individual with Ph.D.-level 
training, who understood the professional microbiology literature, 
and who understood professional procedures for purchasing 
pathogen cultures. He was willing to trade on the access provided 
by his status, while concealing the true purpose of his activities, 
which was to provide al-Qaida with the means to attempt its fi rst 
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real BW production capability. However, he was not prepared to do 
any of the laboratory work himself. There is no evidence in any of the 
declassifi ed pages to indicate that any bacterial cultures had yet been 
obtained, or that any had been shipped to Afghanistan or Pakistan, 
or that any work had yet begun. In fact, all the phrasing on these 
pages suggests that none of these things had yet occurred. There is 
also no mention of the procurement of bacterial culture media that 
would be necessary to have in hand before any work could begin.
 These materials were characterized by various senior U.S. offi cials 
in 2002 and 2003. On February 25, 2002, General Tommy R. Franks, 
the commander of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, reported that 
following the examination of over 110 sites in Afghanistan: 
. . . the United States has yet to fi nd evidence that al-Qaida was able to 
create a chemical or biological weapon at any of its camps, command 
centers, or caves in Afghanistan . . . We have seen evidence that al-Qaida 
had a desire to weaponize chemical and biological capability, but we have 
not yet found evidence that indicates that they were able to do so.100
Similarly in February 2002, U.S. CIA Director Tenet stated:
. . . we know that al-Qaida was working to acquire some of the most 
dangerous chemical agents and toxins. Documents recovered from al-
Qaida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Laden was pursuing a 
sophisticated biological weapons research program.101
In his analogous “Threats” assessment in 2003, Tenet told the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, “I told you last year . . . that 
bin Laden has a sophisticated biological weapons capability. . . . In 
Afghanistan, al-Qaida succeeded in acquiring both the expertise and 
equipment needed to grow biological agents, including a dedicated 
laboratory in an isolated compound in Kandahar.”102
 The inclusion of the words “pursuing” and “research program” 
in 2002 arguably makes the statement factually correct. “Pursuing” 
is not the same as saying that al-Qaida had produced any usable 
product. However, Tenet’s 2003 language is substantially different 
and implies much more, stating that al-Qaida “has a sophisticated 
biological weapons capability” [emphasis added]. Nevertheless, the 
declassifi ed materials permitted some proper understanding for the 
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fi rst time of the basis for statements by U.S. Government offi cials 
that the status of al-Qaida’s BW program might be more advanced 
than had been anticipated. 
 The relevant passages in the annual CIA and Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) threat assessment presentations to the U.S. Senate 
in February 2004 also very likely refl ected judgments based on the 
materials described above. From the Director of the DIA:
Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We 
remain concerned about rogue scientists and the potential that state 
actors are providing, or will provide, technological assistance to terrorist 
organizations. . . . While we have no intelligence suggesting states are 
planning to give terrorist groups these weapons, we remain concerned 
about, and alert to, the possibility.103
And from the Director of the CIA:
. . . I have consistently warned this committee of al-Qaida’s interest in 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Acquiring 
these remains a “religious obligation” in Bin Ladin’s eyes, and al-Qaida 
and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN 
materials. . . . Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-
Qaida’s program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate 
terrorist CBRN threats we are likely face.104
 The report of the U.S. September 11, 2001 (9/11) Commission 
includes a bare few lines on the single individual identifi ed to date, 
a Malaysian, who was to have carried out al-Qaida’s laboratory 
work:
In 2001, [Yazid] Sufaat would spend several months attempting to 
cultivate anthrax for al-Qaida in a laboratory he helped set up near the 
Kandahar airport. . . . Sufaat did not start on the al-Qaida biological 
weapons program until after the JI’s [Jemaah Islamiah] December 2000 
Church bombings in Indonesia, in which he was involved.105
 Yazid Sufaat was arrested in Malaysia in December 2001. Publicly 
available information about him has come from two important al-
Qaida sources. The fi rst was Khaled Sheikh Mohammed who was 
arrested on March 1, 2003, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, at the home 
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of a fugitive Pakistani bacteriologist, Dr. Abdul-Quddis Khan. 
Handwritten notes and computer hard drives were seized in the 
home, showing, according to a reporter’s description, that al-Qaida 
had “. . . completed plans and obtained the materials required to 
manufacture two biological toxins—botulinum and salmonella—
and the chemical poison cyanide.”106 Cyanide would not be 
“manufactured,” and it is ambiguous if the “materials required” 
were the pathogen cultures, the bacterial growth media, equipment 
needed, or which of the above. “Plans” does not indicate that any 
production took place. The press report of these discoveries was 
contradictory in places, but claimed that the recruitment of named 
scientists was discussed in the materials seized, production steps 
were outlined, and equipment, such as that found in Afghanistan, 
was described. Among items found was “a direction to purchase” 
Bacillus anthracis. Nothing so far translated indicated access to the 
most dangerous microbial strains or to any advanced processing or 
delivery methods.
 Mohammed also told his interrogators that Sufaat “. . . took the 
lead in developing biological weapons for al-Qaida until he was 
arrested by Malaysian authorities.”107 Sufaat reportedly obtained a 
Bachelors degree “in biological sciences,” with a “clinical laboratory 
concentration” from California State University in Sacramento in 1987. 
He then served as a laboratory technician in the Malaysian military 
and in 1993 established a company in Malaysia “to test the blood and 
urine of foreign workers and state employees for drug use.”108 In the 
course of recent years, his company, and possibly another owned 
by his wife, appear to have been involved in fi nancial transfers and 
the purchase of ammonium nitrate for producing explosives on 
behalf of groups affi liated with al-Qaida operating in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines. The suggestion that Sufaat was not 
able to procure an appropriate strain of anthrax for use as a pathogen 
demonstrates the same diffi culty faced by the Aum Shinrikyo group 
in Japan, which was only able to obtain the veterinary vaccine strain 
of anthrax. This appears to have been corroborated by reports in 
October 2003.109 A photograph taken at an internationally supported 
animal vaccine production facility outside of Kabul by an Associated 
Press photographer in November 2001 showed a large glass carboy 
jar labeled “Anthrax spore Concentration.” It almost certainly 
34
contained Sterne strain anthrax vaccine. While incriminating as to 
al-Qaida’s eventual intentions, all information to date indicates that 
al-Qaida could not possibly have been responsible for the anthrax 
attacks in the United States in 2001.
 Additional reporting about Yazid Sufaat came from Hambali 
(Raduan Isamuddin), the Indonesian operative of the al-Qaida 
affi liated organization, Jemaah Islamiah, who was responsible for 
the Bali bombing attack in August 2003. After his capture, Hambali 
told his interrogators that he had earlier been collaborating with 
Sufaat, that he had been “trying to open an al-Qaida bio-weapons 
branch plant,” and that Sufaat had been “working on an al-Qaida 
anthrax program in Kandahar,” in Afghanistan, but that after the U.S. 
attack on the Taliban, they had planned to move the “program” to 
Indonesia. However, Sufaat had been unable to obtain a pathogenic 
strain of anthrax.110 In another report, U.S. and Malaysian security 
offi cials more accurately described the al-Qaida program to develop 
biological and chemical weapons as having been “in the early 
‘conceptual stage’ when it was cut short by the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan.”111 CBS nevertheless reported this as “al-Qaida may 
be hard at work trying to produce weaponized anthrax and other 
biological weapons.” Two weeks later, rumors that Jemmah Islamiah 
branches in the Philippines were producing biological or chemical 
agents were quickly proved to be spurious.112
 An important question is how much and what kind of actual 
laboratory work Sufaat might have been able to achieve in the 
“several months” available to him at the Kandahar site. Sufaat and 
Hambali apparently made four trips between Kandahar and Karachi 
to purchase materials.113 The 1,000+ kilometer distance each way 
means that these trips would have been by air, but nevertheless 
could have together required several weeks to a month. Other lower-
ranking al-Qaida members also made purchasing trips to Pakistan. 
As best is known, the Kandahar site appears not to have yet been 
functioning, and may have contained little equipment aside from an 
autoclave.
 In addition to the declassifi ed documentation found in Kandahar, 
information obtained through the interrogations of K. S. Mohammed, 
Hambali, and possibly some others at Guantanamo, Cuba, there was 
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yet one more source of information that was obtained from within 
al-Qaida regarding its interest in biological weapons. Additional 
fragments of information found at the end of 2001 on computer discs 
that appear to have belonged to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri provide 
little confi dence in the competence of the al-Qaida group to carry 
out either chemical or biological agent production. If anything, they 
detract from assumptions of capability, although they apparently 
date from early in their efforts. The initial program investment was 
either $2,000 or $2,000 to $4,000, and, after several months, Dr. al-
Zawahiri considered it to have been “wasted effort and money.” The 
group at that time seemed quite constrained in economic resources 
as well as in applicable talent, and did not at all appear to have the 
kinds of fi nancial resources available to the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo 
group. This early effort appears to have been intended to produce 
a “nerve gas” from a commercial agricultural insecticide. Perhaps 
the most important information in an al Zawahiri memorandum of 
April 15, 1999, is contained in the following sentences:
. . . we only became aware of them [biological weapons] when the enemy 
drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they 
can be produced simply with easily available materials. . . .
I would like to emphasize what we previously discussed—that looking 
for a specialist is the fastest, safest, and cheapest way [to embark on a 
biological and chemical weapons program].114
Other information indicates that Al-Zawahiri’s remark about “the 
enemy drew our attention to them” refers to U.S. Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen’s November 1997 national television appearance, 
which included greatly exaggerated prediction of what his 5-pound 
bag of sugar standing in for anthrax could achieve if dispersed over 
Washington, DC.115
 Early in March 2005, a press item returned to the material found 
on a computer disc when K.S. Mohammed was captured, and the 
sentence quoted earlier from the 2003 Washington Post story: “. . . 
[al-Qaida] obtained the materials required to manufacture two 
biological toxins—botulinum and salmonella—and the chemical 
poison cyanide. They are also close to a feasible production plan 
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for anthrax.”116 This information was attributed to “U.S. intelligence 
services quoted in the U.S. media.” This can only refer to the general 
and ambiguous statement by senior U.S. intelligence offi cials quoted 
previously. As indicated, the cyanide information dates back to 1998. 
“Managed to obtain material necessary to make” does not indicate 
that anything was made, or even that all materials necessary—such 
as the pathogen—had been obtained. The very next day, an editorial 
in the Washington Post stated, “This country has already experienced 
one anthrax attack. Security offi cials have repeatedly stated their 
belief that al-Qaida and others continue to search for more lethal 
bioweapons.”117 The “others” referred to by Tenet in February 2004 
claimed their interest in “CBRN” not specifi cally “bioweapons.” 
And there are no identifi able public statements by U.S. “security 
offi cials” saying that “al-Qaida and others” were searching “for more 
lethal bioweapons” than anthrax. It is possible that the “security 
offi cials” that Washington Post editors had in mind came from 
another press comment during a March 1, 2005, Interpol conference: 
“Security offi cials have long worried of the risk of an al-Qaida attack 
using biological weapons such as anthrax, ricin, botulinum toxin, 
smallpox, plague, or Ebola.”118 There are no identifi able statements 
by any “security offi cial” warning of the potential use by al-Qaida of 
smallpox or Ebola, and the suggestion is highly implausible.
 On March 31, 2005, the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
became available. The information that it contained concerning 
the status of al-Qaida and BW was vastly different from the brief 
paragraph in the report of the 9/11 Commission.
The Intelligence Community concluded that at the time of the 
commencement of the war in Afghanistan, al-Qaida’s biological weapons 
program was both more advanced and more sophisticated than analysts 
had previously assessed.
. . . al-Qaida’s biological program was further along, particularly with 
regard to Agent X, than prewar intelligence indicated. The program was 
extensive, well-organized, and operated for 2 years before September 
11, but intelligence insights into the program were limited. The program 
involved several sites in Afghanistan. Two of these sites contained 
commercial equipment and were operated by individuals with special 
training. Documents found indicated that while al-Qaida’s primary 
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interest was Agent X, the group had considered acquiring a variety of 
other biological agents. The documents obtained at the training camp 
included scientifi c articles and handwritten notes pertaining to Agent X.
Reporting supports the hypothesis that al-Qaida had acquired several 
biological agents possibly as early as 1999, and had the necessary 
equipment to enable limited, basic production of Agent X. Other 
reporting indicates that al-Qaida had succeeded in isolating cultures of 
Agent X. Nevertheless, outstanding questions remain about the extent of 
biological research and development in pre-war Afghanistan, including 
about the reliability of the reporting described above.119
The sources for the Commission’s remarks all refer to classifi ed 
reports. The two Presidential Commissions appear to have used 
different procedures to obtain documents for examination, and one 
suggestion is that, as a result, they did not, in all cases, obtain the 
same documentation for review.120 Of course, if the hard information 
prior to the coalition invasion of Afghanistan regarding al-Qaida and 
BW was nil, then their efforts will certainly appear “more advanced 
and more sophisticated” than was previously understood once the 
actual information in the now declassifi ed documents was found. Is 
it possible to make any further guesses regarding the substance of 
the Commission’s phrasing?
 The information in the “documents obtained at the training 
camp” and “the handwritten notes” have just been explained in 
detail in the preceding pages, and concern anthrax, botulinum toxin, 
plague, and Hepatitis A and C. Hepatitis viruses are extremely 
diffi cult to work with, even for professional virologists. They require 
cell culture technology, but could in theory be used to contaminate 
food and water. The most recent U.S. intelligence statements quoted 
earlier refer more often to botulinum toxin than they do to anthrax. 
Nevertheless, “Agent X” almost certainly refers to anthrax, with 
botulinum toxin the most plausible second guess. The key question 
regarding the information quoted above is whether there is additional 
documentary or material evidence to support it beyond that already 
obtained in the papers found in November 2001 and the locations 
occupied at that time.121 Those did not indicate success “in isolating 
cultures of Agent X.” And only the Sterne vaccine strain had been 
available to the group in Afghanistan. The statement that much of 
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the Commission’s brief summation was a “hypothesis” dependent 
on “reporting,” at the same time as there remain “outstanding 
questions . . . including about the reliability of the reporting described 
above,” seems to leave much of it an open question and possibly 
adds nothing of substance to what was already known from the 
declassifi ed documents.122 Nevertheless, the reference to two sites 
containing “commercial equipment” may suggest additional al-
Qaida efforts beyond those disclosed in the declassifi ed documents 
and related information so far available to the author.
 A member of the Presidential Intelligence Commission was 
asked if he thought that one should be any less skeptical regarding 
the intelligence concerning al-Qaida BW activities in Afghanistan 
than the allegations that had been made by the U.S. administration 
regarding the status of Iraq’s BW program in the years between 
1995 and 2002. He replied that one should not be any less skeptical 
regarding the intelligence about al-Qaida’s BW capabilities.123
Table 2. Comparison of BW Efforts 
by the Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaida.
 Pakistani press reports indicate that the Pakistani microbiologist 
who had assisted al-Qaida in information gathering, as well as an 
alleged “Yemeni . . . studying microbiology at the University of 
Karachi” were arrested in October 2001. If this is the case, with the 
facility overrun by U.S. forces in December 2001, Sufaat also arrested 
in December 2001, and the two above individuals arrested in October 
2001, even before US/UK forces had found the documentation in 
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Kandahar, it would appear that the al-Qaida BW program may have 
been dismantled at the end of 2001. The location of Dr. Khan, in whose 
home K. S. Mohammed was captured, is known to the Pakistani 
government. He is incapacitated and is therefore reportedly not a 
factor of concern. Whether other dispersed individuals of the group 
have any available work sites for microbiology in any other location 
is unknown. The statement by French Interior Minister Dominique 
de Villepin at Interpol’s First World Conference on Bioterrorism in 
Lyon, France, on March 2, 2005, claiming that “. . . after al-Qaida 
groups were smashed in Afghanistan, international terrorist groups 
were still working on chemical and germ weapons in Georgia’s 
Pankisi Gorge” seems highly implausible insofar as it refers to “germ 
weapons.”124 Al-Qaida elements in the Pankisi Gorge had reportedly 
been killed, captured, or dispersed by a joint U.S.-Georgian special 
operation in 2002. In contrast to the French statement, Major 
General Eric Olson, the second ranking U.S. military offi cer in 
Afghanistan, told the Associated Press on February 25, 2005, that he 
had no indications that al-Qaida was attempting to obtain nuclear or 
biological weapons, that there was “no evidence that they’re trying 
to acquire a terrorist weapon of that type.”125
 The three terrorist groups that have been innovative in their 
methods have one aspect in common: the Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka, 
the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, and the al-Qaida organization have 
all actively recruited among educated, college graduates, and 
specifi cally sought individuals with particular knowledge and 
training. (The Tamil Elam showed no interest in BW, and in only 
one anomalous incident used industrial canisters of chlorine gas.) 
K. S. Mohammed completed a degree at a U.S. college, as did Yazid 
Sufaat. An unclassifi ed summary of information on detainees at 
Guantanamo states that “More than 10 percent of the detainees 
possess college degrees or obtained other higher education, often at 
Western colleges, many in the United States. Among these educated 
detainees are medical doctors, airplane pilots, aviation specialists, 
engineers, divers, translators, and lawyers.”126 At least one holds a 
degree in electrical engineering, another holds a graduate degree in 
aviation management, and a third holds a masters degree in petroleum 
engineering. Such recruiting patterns do not automatically translate 
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into either interest or capability in BW, but they would be a key 
advantage should the interests of such a group turn in that direction, 
as Dr. al Zawahiri’s memorandum quoted earlier indicates.
 The reports of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and 
that of the U.S. CIA’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG) provide valuable 
insights into what one might expect of the initial efforts by a terrorist 
group. The report of the ISG describes the initial failures of the 
Iraqi national CW program to produce a chemical weapon between 
1971 and 1978.127 The information provided does not clarify if the 
impediments were in the industrial synthesis of chemical agents or 
in their weaponization. Nevertheless, this involved a state program, 
state resources, and a period of 8 years. It was previously known 
from UNSCOM reports that the same failure occurred in the Iraqi 
BW program in the “early 1970’s,” and again between 1974 and 
1978. The ISG report also provides information on two efforts made 
by insurgent groups inside Iraq in 2002-03 to produce very basic 
chemical weapon agents. Although the services of several chemists 
were obtained to produce the agents, both these efforts failed.128 It is 
uniformly assumed that the production of classical chemical weapon 
agents as well as their dissemination is simpler than that of classical 
biological weapon agents.
 All of the preceding explains the crucial signifi cance of establishing 
precisely who was the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax incidents in 
the United States, and how and where the anthrax preparation was 
produced. It is the sole outlier event. Without it, and except for the 
Rajneesh salmonella incident, there would still be no evidence of 
capability on the part of a nonstate actor to produce a biological agent. 
There has also been no evidence to date of the provision of assistance 
by a state to a nonstate actor to produce biological agents.129 If it should 
turn out, as is currently assumed, that the Amerithrax perpetrator 
came from within the U.S. Government’s own biodefense program, 
with access to strains, laboratories, people, and knowledge, then all 
the conceptions about the signifi cance of the events get substantially 
altered. It does not alter the fact that it can be done, and that the 
preparation could have been dispersed in a much more harmful 
way. But it does affect the crucial question of “By Whom”?—and 
the projections imputed to traditional “terrorist” groups.130 With this 
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exception, all attempts by other groups have either failed or been 
limited to relatively low levels of competence. Reports in 2002 and 
again in mid-2004 indicated that the investigations into the source of 
the anthrax used in the U.S. events were yielding results.131 These had 
apparently reached the stage that suggested which U.S. laboratory 
had been the source of the strain used. Nevertheless, there has been 
no identifi cation of the perpetrator or resolution of the case. In the 
words of former Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Chemical and Biological Defense, Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, “We 
do not know who was responsible. We do not know the source of 
the anthrax spores (i.e., were they produced, stolen, or purchased?). 
We do not know the motive for the attacks. And, therefore, we are 
unable to make intelligent assessments about the likelihood of similar 
attacks in the future.”132
 In the midst of all these developments, and the information 
derived from investigations in Afghanistan, October 2003 saw 
the amazing report that the U.S. DoD had been selling surplus 
equipment of the kind that could be used precisely for producing 
BW pathogens, and that some of the equipment purchased by 
middlemen in the United States had been resold to buyers in, among 
other countries, the Philippines, Malaysia, Egypt, Canada, Dubai, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), “for transit to other countries 
prohibited from receiving exports of trade security controlled items.” 
U.S. offi cials in the past had identifi ed individuals in Canada, the 
Philippines, Dubai, and in the UAE who are known to be involved 
in transshipments to terrorist-supporting countries. The sales had 
been made by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, 
which in 3 1/2 years had sold 18 safety cabinets, 199 incubators, 521 
centrifuges, 65 evaporators, and 286,000 full-body protective suits.133
One can compare this to the reports of the few pieces of elementary 
equipment found in the al-Qaida site in Afghanistan, and the 
signifi cance that was given to those fi nds. 
 The items sold are all available on the commercial market in 
the United States as well as elsewhere, but DoD’s selling price was 
additionally “pennies on the dollar” of the cost of the original items. 
More accurately, it averaged 10 cents on the dollar of original costs, 
even if the equipment was unused. In the words of a Congressional 
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subcommittee chairman, “DoD should not be a discount outlet for 
bioterrorism equipment.” Export of these items would routinely 
require an export license if they had been sold for export, and the 
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had already begun 
monitoring the import and export of the same kinds of materials. 
Even recent internal DoD regulations had been violated. The U.S. 
GAO, the investigative and oversight body that serves the U.S. 
Congress, was responsible for the report, which documented this 
absent-minded but gross evasion by a branch of the U.S. DoD of 
common sense and of existing export controls on materials that could 
be used for the production of biological agents. 
 After the years of strident alarms regarding the interest of 
international terrorist groups in biological weapons, and after the 
U.S. domestic anthrax incidents in 2001 and the enormous post-9/11 
buildup of “Homeland Security” to protect against bioterrorism 
involving expenditures of $7-8 billion by the time of the GAO 
report in the fall of 2003, this was an amazing demonstration of one 
dysfunctional branch of government facilitating exactly what the rest 
of the government was ostensibly trying to protect against. To add 
to the irony, the 3 1/2-year period investigated—between October 1, 
1999, and March 31, 2003—places its onset during the tenure of none 




FRAMING “THE THREAT” AND SETTING THE AGENDA 
OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND POLICY PRESCRIPTION
 Well before October-November 2001, the spectre of “bioterrorism” 
benefi ted from an extremely successful sales campaign. Between 
1995 and 2001, the most common portrayal of the potential for 
“bioterrorism” was the facile catchphrase, “It’s not a matter of 
whether; just when.”134 This proved to be one of the most successful 
catchphrases since the old soap-powder advertisement, “Duz Does 
Everything.” But, of course, it was a matter of both “whether” and 
“when,” or at least it might have been in this initial period. Those 
calling for preparation and preventive measures certainly believed, 
at a minimum, that the imagined sequel to whether and when, 
“. . . and with what consequences,” could be affected. That was the 
purpose of the wake-up calls. But “whether” and “when” were 
modifi able also, depending on the policies chosen. It depended 
most particularly on how the threat was portrayed, and how that 
portrayal was broadcast to potentially interested parties around the 
world. Perhaps bioterrorism is a given between whenever “now” 
is and decades hence, but lots of things can intervene between now 
and then. The infl ated predictions that were common were certainly 
not realistic. Much worse, in addition to being wrong, infl ated 
predictions were counterproductive. They induced interest in BW in 
the wrong audiences.
 One immediate problem was the confl ation of biological 
weapons and “bioterrorism” (and even between biological “agents” 
and “weapons”). Biological weapon use had been possible in the 
entire 20th century. Now the entire subject became subsumed 
under “bioterrorism.” That simple switch in language made it 
easy to transfer levels of state capability to “terrorists.” Everything 
became and was referred to as “bioterrorism.” This wiped out any 
discrimination, or attempt to discriminate, between the relevant 
capabilities of state programs and existing terrorist groups as they are 
known to date. The possibility of incidents involving low numbers of 
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casualties evolved in 2 or 3 years to “mass casualty” terrorism, and 
in several more years to “Apocalyptic Terrorism.” Generic terrorist 
groups (excluding the perpetrator of the U.S. anthrax events)—none 
of which had yet shown the ability to master their microbiological A, 
B, C’s in the real world—were endowed with the prospective ability 
to genetically engineer pathogens. Yet the resources and capabilities 
available to states and to terrorist groups are vastly different.
 If we go back 10 years or so, we can look at a series of portrayals 
of the threat. A 1997 U.S. DoD Defense Science Board report grouped 
the characteristics of both chemical and biological warfare agents:
 • They are relatively easy to obtain (certainly compared to 
nuclear), and potential users do not need access to large and 
expensive facilities to achieve potent capabilities.
 • They can be developed and produced in laboratory or small 
scale industrial facilities, which makes them diffi cult to detect. 
Also, the technologies required to produce them often have 
commercial applications as well, so their “dual use” can be 
plausibly denied.
 • They can be extremely lethal, so small quantities can be very 
effective.
 • They can be delivered by a variety of means.135
The paragraph went on to add that “A few kilograms of a biological 
agent could threaten an entire city.” Summations of this kind were 
grossly oversimplifi ed even further. Former Secretary of the Navy 
Richard Danzig’s 1997 and 1999 papers contain an example: “. . . 
a kilogram [of anthrax], depending on meteorological conditions and 
means of delivery, has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of 
people in a metropolitan area . . . biological weapons are so potent 
and so cheap . . . the technology is readily available . . . so many of our 
adversaries have biological warfare capabilities . . .”136 They do have 
“the potential,” but they might also kill only few, or none at all. More 
correctly, not 1 kilogram but some 50 kilograms could kill anywhere 
between 0 and 95,000 people, depending on the initial population 
number, the quality and nature of the anthrax preparation, the 
meteorological conditions, and the means of delivery if distributed 
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over a city. More recent model studies by Dean Wilkening at Stanford 
University have demonstrated the diffi culties in releasing biological 
agents so that they are infective in large airborne releases. The model 
studies show very wide ranges of variability, over fi ve log units 
(orders of magnitude).137
 The years between 1995 and 2000 were characterized, then, by:
 • spurious statistics (hoaxes counted as “biological” events);
 • unknowable predictions;
 • greatly exaggerated consequence estimates;
 • gross exaggeration of the feasibility of successfully 
producing biological agents by nonstate actors, except in the 
case of recruitment of highly experienced professionals, for 
which there still was no evidence as of 2000;
 • the apparent continued absence of a thorough threat 
assessment; and,
 • thoughtless, ill-considered, counterproductive, and 
extravagant rhetoric.
 Nonetheless, these descriptions were considered realistic and 
taken seriously by people responsible for public safety in various 
sectors: the Director of the World Trade Center in 2001 reported that 
“What the security people and others were telling us was that the 
threat was chem-bio. . . . We felt this was the coming wave.” He 
acted on that information, purchasing protective suiting and training 
programs for his own security personnel. The very day after 9/11, 
former Secretary of Defense Cohen predicted that the next attack by 
al-Qaida would involve biological weapons. There were authoritative 
assessments during the same period that were substantially different, 
offering more sophisticated accounts of impediments to successful 
“bioterrorism.” Some of these were made by Colonel David Franz, 
then Deputy Commander of USAMRIID; John Lauder, then Special 
Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence; and Dr. Steven 
Block, Chair of a U.S. DoD Defense Science Board “Summer Study 
on Biological Weapons”—as well as Dr. Brian Jenkin’s critique of 
“fact-free analysis.” All these went by the board after 9/11 and the 
anthrax events that followed in October and November 2001.138
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 Five essential requirements must be mastered in order to produce 
biological agents:
 • One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease 
pathogen.
 • One must know how to handle the organism correctly.
 • One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the 
appropriate characteristics.
 • One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up 
production properly.
 • One must know how to disperse the product properly.139
 A U.S. military fi eld manual dating back to the 1960s remarks 
on the attributes of a desirable BW agent, that in addition to its 
pathogenicity, “means must be available for maintaining the 
agent’s virulence or infectivity during production, storage, and 
transportation.”140 One should add, most particularly during its 
dispersal as well. Two members of Sweden’s biodefense program 
stress methods on how to optimize formulations of BW agents as 
the most critical step of all: “They key competence is . . . how to 
formulate the organisms to facilitate aerosolization of particles that 
cause severe disease by inhalation.”141
 It is interesting that the classifi ed 1999 DIA report quoted earlier in 
the section on state programs contained a single sentence regarding 
the possible use of BW agents by terrorist groups: “Terrorist use 
should also be anticipated primarily in improvised devices, probably 
in association with an explosive.”142 No anticipation of the capability 
for aerosol distribution was mentioned, no overfl ight of cities, sports 
stadiums, etc.
 In a recent BW “Risk Assessment” published elsewhere, a group of 
authors from the Sandia National Laboratory listed a series of factors 
closely paralleling the above as “Technical Hurdles to Successful 
BW Deployment”: acquisition of a virulent agent; production of the 
agent in suitable form and quantity; and, effective deployment of the 
agent.
 This was summed up in simple words as “obtaining a pathogen or 
toxin . . ., isolation, amplifi cation, protection against environmental 
degradation, and development of an effective dissemination method.” 
They concluded that “Even a low-consequence event requires a 
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considerable level of expertise to execute.”143 Dr. Steven Block, Chair 
of the U.S. DoD Defense Science Board Summer Study on biological 
weapons in the late 1990s explained the same requirements. 
A lesson from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that any group bent on developing 
offensive bio-weapons capabilities must overcome two signifi cant 
problems, one biological and the other physical. First, it must acquire 
and produce stable quantities of a suitably potent agent. For a variety 
of reasons, this is not the trivial task that it is sometimes made out to be. 
Second, it must have an effective means of delivering the agent to the 
intended target. For most, but not all, bio-weapon agents, this translates 
into solving problems of dispersal. Programs in both the United States 
and the USSR devoted years of effort to perfecting these aspects.144
 Unfortunately, a recent example provides the sort of grossly 
uninformed description that is more frequently provided to the 
general public. Speaking at the Harvard Medical School on June 1, 
2005, and trading on his training as a medical doctor as he frequently 
does, Senator Frist claimed that “. . . a few technicians of middling skill 
using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment 
in a small and apparently innocuous setting [could] mount a fi rst-
order biological attack. It is even possible to synthesize virulent 
pathogens from scratch, or to engineer and manufacture prions . . .” 
He repeated that this was “the single greatest threat to our safety and 
security today.”145 The remarks are a travesty: “. . . a few technicians . 
. . middling skill . . . few thousand dollars,” leading to a “fi rst-order” 
a biological attack, and additionally extending this to “synthesizing 
virulent pathogens” in the same breath. 
 To bolster his argument, Senator Frist larded his presentation 
with other gross inaccuracies, claiming that “During the Cold War, 
the Soviet Union . . . stockpiled 5,000 tons annually of biowarfare-
engineered anthrax resistant to 16 antibiotics.” The only source in 
the world for the tonnage of anthrax stockpiled by the USSR is Dr. 
Ken Alibek.146 He has never quoted a fi gure higher than 200 tons, and 
he has never claimed that the 200 tons was produced “annually,” 
or in any single year. The USSR’s anthrax stockpile consisted of a 
genetically unmodifi ed classical strain (or strains).147 The antibiotic 
resistant strain which was developed by Soviet BW laboratories in 
the mid- to late-1980s was not resistant to 16 antibiotics, but to half 
that number, and had not yet reached the point of being stockpiled 
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by the time that the Soviet BW program began to be cut back in 1989. 
Finally, the 5,000-ton fi gure is the approximate sum of the annual 
production capacities of all Soviet-era BW mobilization production 
facilities that would have initiated production only with the onset 
of, or just prior to a (nuclear) war with the United States. No such 
quantities of BW agents were ever produced in the USSR.
Scenarios and Exercises.
 If one looks at the scenarios used in various exercises carried 
out by U.S. Government agencies or private institutes, one fi nds the 
following:148
 • [Unnamed], March 1998, Mexico-Texas border: smallpox 
chimeric viral agent (following Alibek).
 • Top Off I, May 2000: aerosolized plague, FEMA and U.S. 
Department of Justice.
 •  [Unnamed], July 2000: aerosolized pneumonic plague, U.S. 
Department of Justice and DoD DTRA.
 • Dark Winter, June 2001: aerosolized smallpox, Johns Hopkins 
Center for Biosecurity and three collaborating groups.
 • Sooner Spring, April 2002: smallpox, National Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Oklahoma.
 • Top Off II, May 2003: aerosolized plague, U.S. DHS and U.S. 
Department of State.
 • Atlantic Storm, January 2005: Aerosolized dry powder 
smallpox, Center for Biosecurity (now affi liated with the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center).
 • Top Off III, April 2005: aerosolized pneumonic plague, U.S. 
DHS.
 The Dark Winter exercise used a person-to-person secondary 
transmission rate (RO) of 10, three times the historical average of 
three.149 Pneumonic plague has a historical average transmission rate 
of one.150 Nevertheless, there are indications that the Top Off 2 and 
3 exercises used values fi ve times as high, and the July 2000 exercise 
used a value of 10. Such infl ated transmission rates, of course, 
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make it next to impossible for the game players to do very much to 
contain the outbreak, and assure a disastrous outcome irrespective 
of whatever control measures the players may attempt to carry out.
 Plague is known to microbiologists who routinely work with 
it as a “diffi cult,” “skittish” agent, “fragile and fastidious” in the 
laboratory. That a terrorist group would be likely to manage that 
seems very unlikely. In addition, plague organisms die very quickly 
when aerosolized, and both the United States and the UK failed for 
years in attempts to aerosolize plague. Both the British and U.S. BW 
programs in the 1950s fi eld tested plague in open air fi eld trials using 
animals, and the tests failed. The USSR BW program, with many 
more man-years of work, apparently did succeed in producing 
an aerosolizable plague agent. Did the Top Off scenario builders 
know of the efforts of the British and American BW programs to 
aerosolize plague and the outcome of those efforts? Did they know 
of the negative results, or decided to simply disregard them in any 
case? In the fi rst case they could be accused of ignorance, in the 
second case of incompetence. They fi nessed the problem, however, 
by saying that the terrorists “obtained a sample” of the plague. But 
what kind of sample? Was it aerosolizable? From whom did they get 
it? In what quantity? Did they have to culture it? If so, how did they 
manage that? How was it dispersed? The scenario is not meant to 
answer these questions, which, of course, would all be crucial in the 
real world to determining whether a terrorist group was capable of 
producing and dispersing plague. Its purpose is simply to present a 
situation for the responders to deal with, without bothering with the 
question of how the situation came about, its likelihood, or in fact if 
it could take place at all.
 In an infl uential August 2003 monograph, Richard Danzig 
suggested four cases that he recommended for “near term planning 
premises.” 
 1. A large-scale outdoor aerosol anthrax attack.
 2. A large-scale outdoor aerosol smallpox attack.
 3. An attack that disseminates botulinum toxin in cold drinks.
 4. An attack that spreads foot and mouth disease among cattle, 
sheep, and pigs.151
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Danzig adds that “. . . these cases . . . are real, possibly imminent, and 
very substantial dangers. Virtually all experts and policymakers agree 
with this.” Despite that, he added “. . . in the immediate future, most 
attacks are likely to be versions, often lesser version, of these cases.” 
Nevertheless, at the same time Danzig routinely speaks of “reloads,” 
and of terrorists producing suffi cient quantities “that can be used 
again and again” in a series of attacks crossing the United States.152
That is scarcely “a lesser version.” Casualties resulting from Case 
#3 would be identifi ed almost immediately and would be quickly 
limited. Case #4 would have serious economic consequences, but 
not human public health ones. Cases #1 and #2 are the signifi cant 
ones, and comparable to the exercise scenarios listed above. 
 The same holds for the BW cases among the offi cial “Planning 
Scenarios” of the U.S. DHS. Of 15 selected scenarios, four concerned 
BW:
 #2. Biological Attack, aerosolized anthrax, in fi ve cities in 
succession;
 #4. Biological Attack, aerosolized plague in three locations in a 
single city;
 #13. Biological Attack, liquid anthrax placed in ground beef in a 
factory, resulting in intestinal anthrax, mortality in the low hundreds; 
and,
 #14. Biological Attack, Foot and Mouth Disease; economic loss, 
no human mortality.153
Again, it is the fi rst two of these four scenarios that are of prime concern 
since they are the ones capable of producing mass casualties.154
 However, the capabilities that would have to be posited for the 
above scenarios are far beyond the present and “near term” capabilities 
of any known terrorist group. (As before, the perpetrator(s) of the 
U.S. anthrax events is/are excluded.) That is particularly the case for 
smallpox. The counter argument, even by those who accept that fact, 
is obvious, and was presented by Dr. Gerald Epstein in Congressional 
testimony in February 2005.
Exactly how close terrorist groups are right now to the capability to 
conduct a major biological attack matters if we want to know how likely 
it is that such an attack will take place in the near future. However, 
looking out over the several years that our defensive preparations will 
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take to implement, the details of today’s threat are less important than 
the realization that the rapidly increasing capability, market penetration, 
and geographic dissemination of relevant biotechnical disciplines will 
inevitably bring weapons capabilities within the reach of those who may 
wish to use them for harm.155
“Inevitably” is longer than “several” years.
Examining the Assumptions of One Exercise in Detail: Atlantic 
Storm. 
 An excellent example of grossly misleading assumptions 
underlying the more advanced scenarios and base cases was provided 
by the seventh exercise listed above, “Atlantic Storm,” which took 
place on January 14, 2005.156 The comments below concern only the 
assumptions used by the producers of the exercise to argue that the 
terrorist group they envision would have obtained, produced, and 
distributed a dry-powder preparation of smallpox. These comments 
do not concern at all how the scenario unfolded once the hypothesized 
preparation had been released.
The group responsible for producing and releasing the 
smallpox was defi ned as a “Radical al-Qaida Splinter Group.” In 
contrast, as best is known from the declassifi ed documents and all 
the other materials obtained by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan in 
November and December 2001:
 • No al-Qaida capacity for culturing viruses has ever been 
identifi ed.
 • No al-Qaida group has yet been able to obtain a pathogenic 
strain of anthrax.
 • The group operating in Afghanistan in 2000-01 had 
apparently not yet reached the stage of attempting to culture 
vaccine strain anthrax. It had been provided with U.S. and 
UK microbiological journal literature from the 1950s and 
1960s. The “methods” sections of those papers would have 
provided some aid for understanding culturing requirements 
for anthrax. They would not have assured success in doing 
it.
 • Al-Qaida affi liated groups apparently either have not yet been 
able to synthesize ricin, or have not yet attempted to do so. 
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As indicated earlier, the “traces” of ricin reported as having 
been found in London several years ago turned out to be false 
positives. No ricin was found when the United States overran 
the al-Qaida affi liated Ansar al-Islam camp in Northern Iraq 
in March 2003.
The scenario posits that “Seed stocks of Variola major [smallpox] virus . . . 
were obtained . . . from a bioweapons facility in the former Soviet Union. 
This strongly implies that the “facility” suggested would be one 
of the former premier institutes of the Soviet Biopreparat system, 
Vector, located in Koltsovo near Novosibirsk, Russia. When the 
Iranian government made overtures to Vector scientists in the years 
around 1994, offering very generous payment to come and work 
and/or teach in Iran, they failed to convince a single member of the 
institute to come to Iran. These facilities are in better shape now than 
they were 10 years ago, both in their fi nancial circumstances and in 
their biosecurity arrangements. At a fi rst approximation, it therefore 
seems highly unlikely that an al-Qaida affi liated group would be able 
to obtain a smallpox sample from Vector. A U.S. Government offi cial 
with frequent contact with this facility thought that “the probability 
was low.”157
 The Atlantic Storm scenario attempts to prop up the basic 
implausibility of this point in its assumptions by a gratuitous 
“Intelligence Briefi ng” which states that “information from U.S., UK, 
French, and German intelligence” corroborated that the al-Qaida 
group “has made contacts with former Soviet bioweaponeers.” If it 
were the case that no less than four Western intelligence agencies 
had been informed of the “contacts” by the al-Qaida group, it would 
seem that there would have been a good chance to abort the activities 
of the group. The scenario organizers point out that smallpox is also 
assumed to be located in Russia in another institute besides Vector, 
one belonging to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). That may very 
well be the case, but if Vector has, to date, not been penetrated by 
“terrorist” groups, it is still less likely that a Russian MOD facility 
would be successfully penetrated.
 The scenario posits that the al-Qaida group’s scientists received 
microbiological training at Indian and U.S. universities. These 
scientists received additional training when the group hired a 
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scientist who was part of the former Soviet Union’s offensive 
biological weapons program. This scientist taught the [al-Qaida 
group] scientists how to grow a number of biological agents, 
including variola major [smallpox], Bacillus anthracis, Ebola virus, 
and Burkholderia mallei [glanders]. The terrorist group combined 
this knowledge with publicly available technical information to 
develop dry powder preparations of the viruses. Then, with their 
own microbiology training, the terrorist group was able to acquire all 
the required laboratory equipment to grow and process the Variola 
major seed stock they had acquired into a relatively high-quality dry 
powder that was then used in the attacks.
 In the real world, Al-Qaida had one single individual who had 
received a BS degree in Biology “with a clinical concentration” at 
a U.S. college. He could in no way be described as a “scientist.” 
Furthermore, he was arrested in December 2001. The individual 
with more advanced training who supplied al-Qaida with its 
microbiological literature was unwilling to himself do any laboratory 
work for them. The few pieces of standard equipment obtained by 
the group in Afghanistan were rudimentary in the extreme.
 The USSR’s BW program and the organization of its relevant 
institutes would make it extremely unlikely that a single former 
Soviet BW scientist would know how to grow and work with both 
Variola (smallpox) and Ebola viruses, as well as B. anthracis and B. 
mallei bacteria. Even the Soviet virologists who worked with Ebola 
and with Variola were in separate teams. Even more signifi cant, 
growing the viruses in tissue culture requires knowledge of tissue 
culture growth and maintenance. Soviet institutes such as Vector 
had very sizable teams of specialists simply to do the tissue culture 
preparations on which the viruses could grow. These individuals 
would never have had experience growing B. anthracis or B. mallei. 
In addition, not even the Soviet BW program succeeded in making a 
dry-powder preparation of Ebola, the second virus that the scenario 
includes.
 When the former director of a Western national BW defense 
laboratory was asked how long it would take a fully competent 
professional group of experienced microbiologists who had never 
before worked with viruses or tissue culture to successfully grow 
Variola in tissue culture, he estimated 5 years. When asked how long 
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he thought it would take a group of not very competent individuals 
to do it, he estimated 10 years to never.158 Smallpox can also be grown 
on the Chorio-allantoic membrane of fertilized chicken eggs. While 
Soviet scientists grew vaccinia in eggs in their process of making 
vaccine against smallpox, even that requires experience and careful, 
tedious technical work.
 In response to some of these criticisms of the Atlantic Storm 
scenario, two of its principal creators, Colonel Randall Larsen and 
Dr. Tara O’Toole have both invoked, 
. . . a once-secret Defense Department experiment called Project Bacchus 
[sic], which was conducted in the late 1990s to assess whether terrorists 
could create a biological terror weapon using commercially available 
equipment.
The project “demonstrated quite persuasively that about four people, 
only one of whom had any biological training at all—and that was not 
with the U.S weapons program; that was a degree in biology—could, 
using materials bought through the Internet, set up shop, undiscovered, 
and create a Bacillus anthracis look-alike,” O’Toole said.159
 The statement is wrong on numerous grounds. First, the 
description of the Biotechnology Activity Characterization by 
Unconventional Signatures (BACUS) project that has been publicly 
available and is repeated by O’Toole and Larsen is essentially 
misleading.160 Its purpose was not to see “whether terrorists could
create” but to be certain that the experimental group did successfully 
“create,” in order to see if detectable signatures would result that 
could subsequently be used by U.S. forces in the fi eld hunting for 
such sites. To that end, the group was composed of much more than 
“about four people, only one of whom had any biological training at 
all.” The on-site portion of the team was composed of 8-10 people, 
many of whom had post-graduate degrees and experience. One held a 
Ph.D. in microbiology from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Another 
had a masters degree in engineering, while another served in Special 
Forces intelligence, and so on. The team had been specifi cally selected 
so that all the aptitudes considered necessary to complete the project 
successfully would be represented. They were to produce a harmless 
bacterial anthrax simulant; no work with viruses or with any lethal 
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pathogen comparable to smallpox was involved. In addition, this 
on-site group was backed up by four or fi ve highly experienced 
biological weapons specialists acting as consultants, whose role it 
was to oversee their work to be certain that no errors were made, to 
the point of correcting a decimal place in a calculation.
 In addition, the same group had gone through this exercise in an 
earlier classifi ed project named BITE SIZE. The two projects differed 
primarily in their physical location—underground and above 
ground—and the purpose of both projects was to serve as a test for 
new detection methodologies. They were not experiments to see 
“whether” the group could succeed. The claim that the experience 
of the BACUS group proves the legitimacy of the Atlantic Storm 
scenario is completely unsupportable.
Location of preparatory work by the al-Qaida splinter group: 
The scenario describes the group’s laboratory as having been 
“disguised as a small brewery in Klagenfurt, Austria.” With all 
the years of claims that the production of biological agents could 
take place “in breweries,” it would not be surprising if readers of the 
extensive media coverage of the Atlantic Storm exercise might have 
thought that the smallpox was being grown in the fermenting vats 
of a brewery. For various technical reasons, that would be virtually 
impossible. Viral bioreactors are, in contrast to brewery fermenting 
vats, relatively small. The scenario, in fact, does not explain by which 
method the group would have been able to produce its smallpox. It 
says only “Smallpox virus can be grown in embryonated eggs and a 
variety of tissue culture systems.” Work with viruses and cell culture 
is very much more diffi cult than growing bacterial cultures, and the 
diffi culties of cell culture for the putative group have been referred 
to above. Embryonated chicken eggs must be special-ordered. The 
suppliers are limited, and the customers are limited and usually 
well-known to the suppliers. If the group ordered the thousands and 
possibly tens of thousands of embryonated eggs and the egg incubators 
that would be required for this method of growing smallpox virus, 
local suppliers might wonder why an ostensible brewery needed 
thousands of embryonated eggs, since only yeast, hops, and grain 
would be ordered by a brewery. Suppliers therefore would be likely 
to report such information to local authorities, offering another 
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opportunity to abort the group’s activities. Operating breweries in 
Austria are very highly regulated and routinely inspected. Even 
construction of a brewery requires government licensing, design 
approval and construction inspections. Applications for ownership 
or operation are also regulated. Inspectors who would chance on 
masses of incubating embryonated eggs would immediately be 
alerted to the covert operation.161
 The group would also have to prevent the escape of the grown 
smallpox virus in liquid and solid waste effl uents. Incineration, 
water sterilization and air-handling equipment are not normally 
installed in “a small brewery.” These auxiliary systems alone are 
relatively large, and the ability for them to be housed together with 
the laboratory facilities “in a building as small as a 3-car garage,” 
which the scenario suggests would be possible, is extremely unlikely. 
More probably, it is impossible. These auxiliary systems must also 
be custom-installed by specialists, and then tested. Depending on 
how or where the smallpox vaccinations for the terrorist group were 
obtained, that too could run the risk of being noted.
The Atlantic Storm scenario involved the distribution of a 
dry-powder smallpox preparation from “a commercially available 
dry powder dispenser” by vaccinated individuals in six different 
cities (Istanbul, Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Warsaw, Los Angeles, and 
New York City) over a span of 4 days. As regards preparation of the 
smallpox powder, the scenario says only that “several sources for 
information on methods” are available, and that “Variola virus can 
be processed to a stable dried form just as vaccinia virus is dried to 
make a vaccine.”
 Such work was never carried out in the British government’s 
BW program. Work with virus culture in the British program was 
extremely rudimentary overall. It did advance further in the pre-
1969 U.S. BW program, but some years ago one of the individuals 
involved in that work, Dr. William Patrick, offered the judgment 
that “Only a state-sponsored group of terrorists with a lot of money 
and connections would be able to acquire the smallpox virus and the 
means for wielding it as a weapon.”162 The Atlantic Storm scenario 
producers knew this quotation, since they have elsewhere used an 
accompanying sentence by Patrick as a source.
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 Speaking at a conference on April 22, 2005, after the details of 
Atlantic Storm were known, Dr. Ken Alibek, the former Deputy 
Director of the Soviet-era Biopreparat BW research and development 
program, commented that he could “not understand why some 
people make these scenarios using dry powder smallpox.” He 
explained that “no one”—that is, the Soviet BW program—“wanted 
to or could develop dry powder smallpox.”163 He gave two reasons 
for that: fi rst, that the Soviet BW program had been able to develop 
a preparation that kept smallpox stable in liquid; and second, that it 
was much too dangerous for their own staff to prepare dry powder 
smallpox preparations, even working in facilities with elaborate and 
advanced containment systems. The claim in the Atlantic Storm 
scenario that, nevertheless, this could have been achieved by a small 
inexperienced group has absolutely no chance of being credible.
 As for “Sources for Information” on methods, simply having them 
on paper would certainly not be suffi cient, though it is the necessary 
fi rst step. Even vaccinia is grown under conditions of containment, 
but there is one critical difference: drying variola would have to be 
carried out under extremely rigorous conditions of containment 
of the opposite nature, that is, under negative air pressure, rather 
than positive. The necessary air-handling equipment is sizable and 
is not part of the infrastructure of a brewery. It is also not simply 
purchasable from catalogues and, as indicated, would have to be 
custom installed. 
 Elsewhere, Dr. Patrick has written, 
A dry product with these [desired] properties requires serious 
development with skilled personnel and sophisticated equipment. . . . 
[While] Iraq successfully produced high quality liquids of anthrax and 
botulinum toxin A in quantity, their efforts to weaponize their agents 
were crude and far from successful. . . . By analogy, if a dedicated nation 
such as Iraq had problems with agent delivery and dissemination, it 
follows that terrorists would also experience these problems, and at a 
higher level of intensity.164
Dispersal of the dry-powder preparation took place over a period 
of several hours in each location. Does a “commercially available dry 
powder dispenser” produce the particle size distribution required 
for human aerosol infection? Is it battery-powered or gas cartridge-
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powered to operate noiselessly? The device that the Aum Shinrikyo 
group had made but never used in a Tokyo subway was designed to 
distribute a liquid and would have worked for only a short period.
Spread of the smallpox epidemic. The Atlantic Storm scenario 
uses rates of fi rst generation person-to-person transmission of 1:3, and 
1:0.25 for second generation transmission. This is a major correction 
from the value of 1:10 used by the same exercise sponsor in “Dark 
Winter,” its previous smallpox exercise in June 2001. As recently as 
the spring of 2004, a member of the University of Pittsburgh group 
still defended the 1:10 estimate in a briefi ng given in Washington, 
DC.165
Adding anthrax production by the same “al-Qaida splinter 
group,” presumably at the same brewery location. Several months 
after the initial Atlantic Storm exercise, its creators were able to repeat 
the exercise with 28 of the 34 members of the Homeland Security 
Committee of the U.S. Congress. After replaying the Atlantic Storm 
scenario (which followed a separate simulation of a terrorist attack 
using a 10 kiloton nuclear device), this time yet another component 
was added: “. . . [a] few days into the disaster, terrorists followed 
up with anthrax attacks in major cities.”166 No other details were 
provided. This adds an entire additional layer of implausibility 
regarding the ability of an “al-Qaida splinter group” to produce 
anthrax, the delivery of growth media to the “brewery,” and so on, 
not to speak of the technical requirements of producing both anthrax 
and dry-powder smallpox. Brewery fermenters are not useful for 
growing anthrax, just as they are not useful for growing smallpox.
The individuals who played the roles of “World Leaders” 
in the exercise. These took the roles of purely political fi gures, 
presidents and prime ministers of their respective countries, except 
for one who played the role of Director-General of the World Health 
Organization (WHO). Of the 12 individuals, one had been the former 
Director-General of WHO, and a second had been a Minister of 
Health. Nevertheless, none had any experience with issues regarding 
biological weapons. This point is mentioned only to note that none 
apparently raised any questions regarding the basic plausibility of 
the scenario. According to those responsible for the exercise, the 
players were not even informed of the antecedent assumptions that 
are being discussed here. Two members of a European advisory 
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panel to the Atlantic Storm exercise recommended that it should 
deal with an outbreak of pandemic fl u rather than smallpox, but the 
suggestion was rejected. Had pandemic fl u been chosen, references 
to a “radical al-Qaida splinter group,”  invoking “bioterrorism,” and 
so on would all have had to be discarded.
Media response. As best is known, not a single report of the 
exercise raised any questions whatsoever regarding the plausibility 
of the basic assumptions of the scenario.167 Dr. O’Toole, Director of 
the Pittsburgh group that produced the exercise, stated that “The 
scenario we posited is very conservative. . . . This could have been 
much worse. The age of engineered biological weapons is here. It 
is now.”168 Portions of the scenario once it was in play may have 
been conservative; however, “engineered biological weapons” are 
not relevant to an “al-Qaida splinter group,” and they are not “now” 
in relation to “terrorist” groups. Dr. O’Toole has also claimed that 
the scenario antecedents were made “as scientifi c as possible.” The 
preceding discussion demonstrates that they were very far from 
“scientifi c,” and were a combination of unrealistic and implausible 
imaginings. A Washington Post editorial ended with another O’Toole 
quote: “This is not science fi ction. The age of Bioterror is now,”169
and an enthusiastic Washington Post columnist described the exercise 
as an “eminently plausible scenario.”170 Rather, it was science fi ction 
because the scenario antecedents are not “now,” and they were not 
in the least plausible.
Another Recent Example: Botulinum Toxin 
and the U.S. Milk Supply.
 Substantial controversy surrounded the recent publication of a 
model study examining the consequences of the postulated addition 
of botulinum toxin to the U.S. milk supply.171 Publication of the paper 
in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) had 
been delayed for a month due to a request by an offi cial in the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 172 During that 
interval, the author, Dr. Lawrence Wein, released his conclusions in 
a guest editorial in the New York Times. 173 Dr. Wein, a mathematical 
modeler at the Stanford University School of Business, posited that “a 
terrorist”—that is, a single individual—could produce, variously, a 
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“few grams,” ten grams, or even as much as a kilogram of botulinum 
toxin, “using a 28-page manual called ‘Preparation of Botulinum 
Toxin’ that has been published on several jihadist websites, and 
[could buy] toxin from an overseas black-market laboratory.” He 
estimated that ten grams of the toxin might poison 568,000 people, 
of whom as many as 60 percent might die. 
 It was possible to obtain a copy of the manual, which appeared to 
be composed of the linked reproductions of the methods sections of 
several journal papers. The manual did not explain how to obtain “a 
producer strain” of clostridium botulinum in the fi rst place, other than 
suggesting trial and error from sources in the wild. There are seven 
serotypes of C. botulinum, each containing around 100 strains. Many 
strains of C. botulinum produce no toxin at all, or very little. It took the 
pre-1969 U.S. biological weapons program many man-years of work 
by competent professionals to fi nd a reliable toxin producing strain. 
The manual required the use of a walk-in cold room, a refrigerated 
vacuum centrifuge, highly specifi c reagents, etc. None of these, as 
well as many other necessary components, would likely be found in 
“jihadist” camps. More importantly, having the manual, or having 
the books or journals from which it is derived, does not confer on 
anyone the ability to make botulinum toxin. That requires knowledge 
and experience, and it is not the simplest procedure. Producing ten 
grams would be a feat even for an experienced professional. It is 
useful to remember that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, with no 
constraints on funds for purchasing equipment and supplies, spent 3 
to 4 years attempting to produce botulinum toxin and failed. It is now 
known that the Aum had never even been able to obtain a culture of 
the organism to work with. The author of the model introduced “an 
overseas black market” as an obvious deus machina to evade these 
diffi culties, but no international black market for botulinum toxin is 
known to exist. The author also appeared to be unacquainted with 
the journal literature regarding the purifi cation of Botulinum toxin, 
which would indicate what some of the diffi culties are. 
 The author admitted in the PNAS paper that three variables in 
his model “each contain several orders of magnitude of uncertainty.” 
They appear to each contain at least three orders of magnitude of 
uncertainty. Cumulatively, the author’s calculations could therefore 
be off by as much as nine orders of magnitude—a billion times—
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which could mean that not a single person would be poisoned or 
die. If a mathematical model is widely divergent in its assumptions 
from reality, all the mathematics in the world will not improve the 
accuracy of its predictions.
 One of Dr. Wein’s two main recommendations was that the 
milk industry increase the temperature and duration time for milk 
pasteurization. Over a period of several years, the International Dairy 
Foods Association (IDFA) had, in fact, already done this, developing 
new procedures which result in 99 percent inactivation of any 
botulinum toxin present. By mid-2004, the IDFA had recommended 
to its affi liated milk distributors that such changes be instituted, 
although there was no legal statute that required that the steps be 
followed by all producers. Dr. Wein had learned of this in 2004 while 
giving seminar presentations of his model, but it apparently did not 
alter his calculations.174
 Efforts to arrive at realistic assessments have frequently been 
unwelcome. In 1998, D. A. Henderson wrote that:
Four points of view prevalent among national policy circles and the 
academic community at various times have served to dismiss biological 
terrorism as nothing more than a theoretical possibility. 1) Biological 
weapons have so seldom been deployed that precedent would suggest 
that they will not be used. 2) Their use is so morally repugnant that no one 
would deign to use them. 3) The science of producing enough organisms 
and dispersing them is so diffi cult that it is within the reach of only the 
most sophisticated laboratories. 4) Like the concept of a “nuclear winter,” 
the potential destructiveness of bio-weapons is essentially unthinkable 
and so to be dismissed.175
Henderson concluded that “Each of these arguments is without 
validity.” Three of them certainly are: I have seen no one arguing the 
fi rst, second, or fourth of these parodies. The closest approximation 
to the second are those studies by terrorism experts that seek to 
understand whether real terrorist groups might or might not consider 
using BW in light of their political interests, the potential responses of 
the publics whose support they seek, etc. Examples of such analyses 
by Parachini, Schweitzer, Simon, and others, based entirely on years 
of study of real international terrorist groups and not the result of 
abstract speculation, were referred to earlier. Only the third “point 
of view” which Henderson refers to, with some modifi cation, is at 
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issue. More recently, Jill Dekker-Bellamy, Biodefense Consultant 
to a new European defense policy interest group, the New Defense 
Agenda, wrote:
We shouldn’t be stuck in the box debating the lack of sophistication 
terrorists have yet employed; the feasibility question or which pathogen 
they will use, be it in a material or weaponised form. Our focus instead 
would be better placed considering the stated intent of terrorists to do 
so and preventing and denying them access to all the means to conduct 
their terror campaign. . . .
Much debate has gone into whether or not terrorists or states pose 
the greatest threat in the use of disease as a weapon. These debates 
over whether or not terrorists are capable of successfully conducting a 
biological attack normally get bogged down in a number of areas related 
either to acquisition, technical areas (i.e., feasibility/dispersal/capacity) 
or areas related to kill ratios and casualty numbers as if this is the Geiger 
counter of successful biological terrorism. This may be of interest in 
ranking weapons of mass destruction but not necessarily in ranking a 
successful bio-terror campaign. Contemporary threat assessments, even 
more than 2 years ago, point to smaller groups as now being more likely 
to succeed in a bio-terrorism event, utilizing a diversity of agents.176
 The “contemporary threat assessments” referred to remained 
unidentifi ed, and no one is “stuck in [a] box” or “bogged down.” 
The intellectual “know-nothingism” in the above comment is 
palpable, and harks back to Brian Jenkins’ 1999 description of “fact 
free analysis” in the area of bioterrorism assessment. There is no 
incompatibility between seeking the best preventive measures and 
having a moderately realistic threat assessment. A statement by 
U.S. Department of State Anti-Terrorism Coordinator William Pope 
that “Europe should expect biological, chemical, and radiological 
terrorist attacks at any time” is an example of the inadequacy that 
is so common in many cases.177 In contrast, one recent thorough 
study carried out for the UN WMD (“Blix”) Commission rendered 
a considered assessment without fear of getting into “boxes” or 
“bogged down,” and without contrived scenarios carried out in a 
show-business atmosphere.178
 This brings us to some anticipation of the future. A very brief 2-
page statement released in November 2003 by the U.S. CIA titled “The 
Darker Bioweapons Future” was limited to very general remarks:
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A panel of life science experts convened for the Strategic Assessments 
Group by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that advances 
in biotechnology, coupled with the diffi culty in detecting nefarious 
biological activity, have the potential to create a much more dangerous 
biological warfare threat. The panel noted:
 • The effects of some of these engineered biological agents could be 
worse than any disease known to man.
 • The genomic revolution is pushing biotechnology into an 
explosive growth phase. Panelists asserted that the resulting wave 
front of knowledge will evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex, 
and widely available to the public that traditional intelligence 
means could prove inadequate to deal with the threat from these 
advanced biological weapons.
 • Detection of related activities, particularly the development 
of novel bioengineered pathogens, will depend increasingly 
on more specifi c human intelligence and, argued panelists, 
will necessitate a closer—and perhaps qualitatively different—
working relationship between the intelligence and biological 
sciences communities.
In the last several decades, the world has witnessed a knowledge 
explosion in the life sciences based on an understanding of genes and 
how they work. According to panel members, practical applications of 
this new and burgeoning knowledge base will accelerate dramatically 
and unpredictably.
Growing understanding of the complex biochemical pathways that 
underlie life processes has the potential to enable a class of new, more 
virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical 
pathways and elicit specifi c effects. The same science that may cure some 
of our worst diseases could be used to create the world’s most frightening 
weapons.
The know-how to develop some of these weapons already exists.179
 Others have fi lled in what this may evolve into in future decades 
in more detail. Papers by James Petro, et al., Robert Carlson, Raymond 
Zilinskas, Aleksandr Rabodzey, and others are recent examples which 
were published prior to the brief CIA item above.180 These projections 
are not discussed further here. The purpose of this monograph 
has been to present a current threat assessment of “Bioterrorism” 
and what one may expect “in the near future.” Advanced genetic 
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engineering capabilities are not likely to become available to real-
world nonstate actor/terrorist groups in the near future. Judgments 
based on the prevalence of genetic engineering competence in the 
general academic molecular research community are still not useful 
guides to terrorist capabilities. A classifi ed U.S. Defense Intelligence 
projection prepared in July 1999 looking ahead to 2020 presented 
the following anticipation of developments in future national BW 
programs:
An increasing number of countries with biological warfare programs will 
be able to develop infectious agents such as anthrax and plague, as well 
as toxins such as botulinum and ricin. . . . New types of agents, such 
as modifi ed infectious organisms, low-molecular weight physiologically 
active substances that disrupt body function, and synthetic modifi ed 
toxins, are also in development.181
Given that this was written when the number of existing states with 
offensive BW programs was still considered to be higher and that the 
“new type of agents” referred to had all been available for decades, 
this was a relatively low keyed assessment. Speaking in 2001, Dr. 
Joshua Lederberg, probably the most highly qualifi ed expert in this 
fi eld, said “I don’t think we’re going to leapfrog to the second or 
third generation without seeing some of the more primitive efforts 
in the fi rst instance.”182 In response to a statement by an offi cial of 
the DHS in June 2005 that the Department had “developed a strategy 
to address the potential for a bioengineered attack,” Dr. Richard 
Ebright commented that “There is no—zero—current likelihood 
that a terrorist organization would construct ‘bioengineered’ viral 
pathogens, or would construct ‘bioengineered’ bacterial pathogens 
other than antibiotic-resistant bacterial pathogens.”183
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PART V
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE U.S. BIODEFENSE PROGRAM
 Until quite recently the massive U.S. post-9/11 biodefense buildup 
has been discussed almost exclusively in terms of its presumed 
necessity, the substantial improvements achieved in response 
readiness, the successive increase of expenditure and broadening 
programs, and urgings from various quarters for still further increases 
in expenditure and expansion of programs. Certainly, some of this 
was needed, and others have analyzed the effi cacy or performance of 
various elements of U.S. biodefense expansion since 2001.184 However, 
these programs should be justifi ed on their intrinsic merits, and not 
due to alleged “spin-off” benefi ts for generic public health. “Spin-
off” rationalizations for defense R&D expenditure historically have 
been spurious. They were made for the U.S. BW program over 35 
years ago as well. The suggested “spin off” can always be procured 
for a fraction of the cost of whatever the larger parent program may 
be, by direct, targeted investments.
 There are, however, also costs. The fi rst of these is direct federal 
expenditure. Dr. David Franz is fond of pointing out that in 1996 
and 1997, after the three major BW disclosures—of the USSR’s 
enormous covert and illegal BW program, the Iraqi BW program, 
and the failed attempts of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group to 
produce BW agents—U.S. biodefense expenditures were still in 
the range of roughly $150 million per year. They increased to $414 
million by FY 2001. It was estimated at $7.5 billion for 2005.185 Annual 
civilian biodefense expenditure has risen more than 18-fold and has 
accounted for over $22 billion in expenditure during the past 4 fi scal 
years.186 The U.S. FY 2006 civilian biodefense budget adds another 
$4.2 billion.187 The question, of course, is whether this degree of 
expenditure is merited. That is where the threat assessment should 
be the crucial determinant. Cumulative DoD biodefense expenditure 
for the past 4 years is not available. The budget for the joint DoD 
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CB defense program was $1.25 billion in FY 2004, $1.38 billion in FY 
2005, and $1.6 billion in FY 2006.188
 The paradox of this situation is that this change in U.S. 
Government priorities is primarily due to the events of 9/11, which 
had no relation whatsoever to the capability to produce biological 
agents by terrorist groups. And as has already been indicated, the 
signifi cance of the U.S. anthrax events in regard to the anticipation 
of future events of the same nature carried out by terrorist groups is 
also unclear. In carrying out the 9/11 aircraft attacks in the United 
States, the al-Qaida organization certainly was able to demonstrate 
its enterprise, ingenuity and organizational capabilities—as well as, 
we now know, a modicum of luck and the failure of various existing 
U.S. Governmental functions.189 At the same time, it demonstrated 
that the group had not been spending the major portion of its time 
and effort to develop biological weapons. As a preceding section of 
this monograph indicates, as best is known, little regarding al-Qaida 
and BW has changed since. It is very possible that the U.S. political 
response and the congressional funding levels and programs that 
followed, would have been substantially smaller if it were known 
for certain that the Amerithrax anthrax had been prepared by a U.S. 
professional, or had been diverted from stocks prepared within the 
U.S. biodefense program. On the other hand, it undoubtedly would 
also have led to greater oversight of the U.S. biodefense program.
 Another predictable cost has been the impact on other U.S. public-
health programs and expenditures.190 Currently one-third of both the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) infectious disease budget and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) budget and more 
than half of U.S. Government and corporate vaccine development is 
relegated to biodefense, that is, it focuses on the “select agents,” those 
pathogens that are considered most likely to be used as biological 
weapon agents.191 Equally or more striking were tallies produced in 
February and March 2005 of changes in the funding patterns of the 
National Institutes for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at 
NIH in the years between 1996 and 2000 compared to 2001 to 2004. 
Grants for research on six bacterial pathogens on the select agent 
list grew from 33 in the fi rst 4r-year period to 497 in the second. 
Tabulations for research on viral pathogens were similar, except for 
research on infl uenza. Grants for all other agents dropped between 
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20 and 50 percent just between FY 1999 to 2001 and FY 2002 to 
2004, including for tuberculosis and acquired immune defi ciency 
syndrome (AIDS).192 There has been a 30-fold increase in NIH-NIAID 
biodefense expenditure since 2001. It now accounts for over 35 
percent of the current NIH-NIAID budget, an amount greater than 
for AIDS research and greater than for all other non-AIDS infectious 
disease research.193 An extremely sharp attack on this shift in public 
health priorities appeared in the American Journal of Public Health in 
October 2004.194 At the end of May 2005, NIH announced a shift in 
disbursement schedules for grants that would also lead to an earlier 
termination than planned for grants for some research projects on 
malaria, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.195
 In a May 2005 report on U.S. preparations for a pandemic fl u 
outbreak, the U.S. GAO pointed out that “the Department of Health 
and Human Services has not fi nalized planning for an infl uenza 
pandemic. In 2000, GAO recommended that DHHS complete the 
national plan for responding to an infl uenza pandemic, but the plan 
has been in draft format since August 2004.”196 At the time of the 
2000 report, GAO also took the DHHS to task for lack of progress 
in developing a vaccine against H5N1 fl u.197 At his retirement on 
December 3, 2004, DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson cited 
pandemic fl u as the greatest threat to be faced; yet the situation is 
virtually the same today as it was in 2000. Washington policymakers 
have had almost 9 years since the fi rst outbreak of avian fl u in 1997 
to come to grips with the problem Instead, the focus has been on 
“bioterrorism” and biodefense.
 The U.S. CDC has offered one estimate of the consequences of a 
“medium level” fl u pandemic outbreak in the United States “in the 
absence of any control measures” (e.g., vaccination and drugs):
 • 15 to 35 percent of the U.S. population infected;
 • 20 to 47 million cases of illness;
 • 18 to 42 million outpatient hospital visits;
 • 89,000 to 207,000 deaths; and,
 • “associated costs ranging from $71 billion to $167 billion.”198
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The estimate of mortality appears to be low, given that its lower 
level is about the same as the upper level of ordinary annual U.S. fl u 
mortality as shown in Figure 1 (page 5).
 Nevertheless, even weeks after the above information was 
presented to Congress, U.S. senators and congressmen, both Democrat 
and Republican, were still focused on drumming up support for 
further increases in Federal expenditures against “Bioterrorism” to 
support “Bioshield II,” subsidies for medical countermeasures against 
“select agents.”199 Only in November 2005 did the administration 
fi nally announce a plan and accompanying recommendations for 
expenditures to prepare for and to combat pandemic fl u.
Biodefense Research and the Biological Weapons Convention.
 The third area of cost concerns biological weapons arms control. 
This was treated to some degree in The Problem of Biological Weapons,200
and summarized in a subsequent paper by Jonathan Tucker.201
Tucker makes two major points. The fi rst concerns proliferation, and 
it is that “The most serious risk associated with science-based threat 
assessment is that the novel pathogens and information it generates 
could leak out to rogue states and terrorists.”202 The risk may be less 
a “leak” in the classic sense than simply the accelerated accretion of 
relevant science and publications, and the substantial overall push 
that the fi eld is now getting and which will continue in the coming 
years. Both the Aum Shinrikyo and the al-Qaida groups went back 
to look at professional literature of previous decades. It is the same 
procedure that new or expanding state programs followed, whether 
it was Russia in the 1950s and 1960s, or Iraq in the 1980s.
 Tucker’s second main point is that the greatly increased 
magnitude of the U.S. biodefense R&D program will promote a BW 
arms race, and, at least on the part of others, perhaps not all of it 
of a defensive nature. The same point was made by Dr. Malcolm 
Dando in a submission to the British Parliament in February 2003.203
That arms race, at least in its initial stages, is more likely to be 
with developments in our own BW research program than against 
developments in the programs of other states or nonstate actors. This 
is exactly the process that took place in the United States from the late 
1950s to the mid-1970s regarding development of intercontinental 
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ballistic missile (ICBM) re-entry vehicles (warheads) and ABM 
systems. It was succinctly described by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, 
President John F. Kennedy’s “Science Adviser” (Special Assistant 
for Science and Technology), who had been involved with policy 
planning for these antagonistic weapon systems for years. It was a 
process in which development in our own offensive and defensive 
strategic nuclear missile systems fed off the certain knowledge of 
developments in the other.204 The “intelligence” was much more 
certain than guessing about what was going on in other nations’ 
analogous programs, and could always be assumed, or attributed, 
to them. At times, such attribution was correct, and at times not, 
but even in the former case, new technological developments in the 
U.S. programs quite frequently were made well in advance of when 
they appeared elsewhere. Overall, the outcome was the same as that 
posited by Tucker: the stimulation of parallel programs in other 
states. The same very likely will occur now. At the present time, one 
can assume that a smaller replica of the U.S. biodefense program 
is taking place in Russia, smaller because of the great disparity in 
funding levels. Russia retains the personnel and facilities to build 
on their own work dating from their accelerated 1973 to 1992 (or 
longer) offensive program, as well as the ability to pick up from 
developments in the United States and in the nonmilitary published 
literature on the functioning of the human immune system, etc. In 
some cases, the United States is currently funding research in Russia 
that is BW applicable.205
 The fourth cost also concerns arms control but is suffi ciently 
signifi cant and different to require separate consideration. It is the 
question of whether the U.S. Government, because of the biodefense 
R&D program, remains in compliance with the provisions of the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), specifi cally Article I.
 Towards the end of 1999, U.S. Director of Central Intelligence 
George Tenet had established a Non-Proliferation Advisory Group 
(NAG) to advise the CIA on what kinds of research it should undertake 
in order to better understand the problems that the agency faced 
in learning about WMD proliferation and, if possible, hindering it. 
In one of its meetings, NAG was given a briefi ng on a particular 
CIA BW-related project, code-named “CLEAR VISION.” It involved 
the fabrication and testing of a model of a Soviet BW bomblet.206 It 
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appears that the project was already underway since 1997. One of the 
members of NAG was Dr. Joshua Lederberg, who has served as an 
adviser and consultant for BW issues to U.S. Government agencies 
for the past 4 decades. After hearing the briefi ng, Dr. Lederberg 
raised two considerations:
 • that the project raised BWC compliance issues,
 • that the project raised perceptual issues; that is, if the project 
subsequently became publicly known, it would raise questions 
in the view of observers as to whether the U.S. Government 
was engaged in activities of an offensive BW character.
He therefore suggested that the CIA Director could not authorize 
such a project on his own authority; it would have to be referred to the 
offi ce of the President for consideration, and to undergo interagency 
review.207 Another member of NAG offered a third consideration: 
that if U.S. intelligence agencies discovered that another country 
was carrying out such a project, it would be considered prima facie 
evidence of the existence of an offensive BW program in that country. 
The project was then referred to the National Security Council 
(NSC) for review. It was nevertheless ultimately approved, over the 
minority objections of the legal adviser in the U.S. Department of 
State. It would be carried out at a classifi ed level.208 As indicated, it 
appears the project was already in process by the time the briefi ng 
was given, and before the NSC review took place, and that more than 
one bomblet was actually produced in order to carry out different 
tests at different sites. None of four such projects—CLEAR VISION, 
BACUS, BITE SIZE, and JEFFERSON—were reported by the United 
States in its annual Confi dence Building Measures submissions 
under the terms of the BWC.209 The ongoing utilization of several 
very large aerosol test chambers in U.S. biodefense projects was also 
not reported.
 In the spring of 2004, a briefi ng which described the work 
program planned for the prospective National Biodefense Analysis 
and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), particularly for one of its 
four sub-centers, the Biothreat Characterization Center (BTCC), 
became available.210 It was proposed that studies be carried out 
in 16 different subject areas, of which the following nine seemed 
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particularly signifi cant: genetic engineering; susceptibility to current 
therapeutics; host-range studies; environmental stability; aerosol 
animal-model development; aerosol dynamics; novel packaging; 
novel delivery of threat; bioregulators and immunomodulators; 
and “Red Teaming,” that is, duplication of threat scenarios. In 
addition, task areas for biothreat-agent (BTA) analysis and technical-
threat assessment were summarized as “Acquire, Grow, Modify, 
Store, Stabilize, Package, and Disperse.” Classical, emerging, and 
genetically engineered pathogens were to be characterized for their 
BTA potential. Aerobiology, aerosol physics, and environmental 
stability would be studied in wet-laboratory and computer-
laboratory settings. “Computational modeling of feasibility, 
methods, and scale of production” would be undertaken, and “Red 
Team” operational scenarios and capabilities would be assessed. 
BTA use and countermeasure effectiveness would be studied “across 
the spectrum of potential attack scenarios” through “high-fi delity 
modeling and simulation.”
 Article 1 of the Biological Weapons Convention states:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances 
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise, or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justifi cation 
for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose.
(2) Weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such 
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed confl ict.
In order to assure that the activities of all U.S. Government entities 
remained within the bounds of Article 1, on the ratifi cation of the 
BWC in 1975 the White House issued the so-called “Scowcroft 
Memorandum” on December 23, 1975.211
 As an indication of both the ambiguity and confusion surrounding 
the question of “offensive” and “defensive” biological weapons 
relevant research, the following offi cial U.S. policy statements are 
important to note. A very brief U.S. DoD press statement on January 8, 
2002, on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare Defense answers 
the question, “Is the U.S. still developing biological weapons to use 
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against our enemies?” The answer provided began: “As required by 
executive order, the U.S. Government ceased all offensive biological 
research in November 1969 . . .”212 However, the original 1969 U.S. 
policy decision is worded rather differently. The operative paragraph 
of National Security Decision Memorandum 35 of November 25, 
1969, reads:
The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be confi ned 
to research and developments for defensive purposes (immunization, 
safety measures, etc.). This does not preclude research into the offensive 
aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what 
defensive measures are required.213
The analytic study that supported the U.S. policy decision also 
included a very important relevant paragraph. In response to the 
question, “Should the U.S. maintain only a RDT&E program,” it 
replied:
There are really two sub-issues here: (1) should the U.S. restrict its program 
to RDT&E for defensive purposes only, or (2) should the U.S. conduct both 
offensive and defensive RDT&E? While it is agreed that even RDT&E for 
defensive purposes only would require some offensive R&D, it is also 
agreed that there is a distinction between the two issues. A defensive 
purposes only R&D program would emphasize basic and exploratory 
research on all aspects of BW, warning devices, medical treatment, and 
prophylaxis. RDT&E for offensive purposes would emphasize work on 
mass production and weaponization and would include standardization 
of new weapons and agents.214
 At least through 1989, DoD considered studies which produced 
more virulent pathogens, sought to stabilize them, or studied 
dissemination methods, to be characteristic indicators of offensive
BW research, and explicitly prohibited by the BWC. This was stated 
by Colonel David Huxsoll, then director of USAMRIID, in testimony 
to the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in May 1989, 
and clearly displayed in a diagrammatic schema attached to his 
testimony. (See Figure 2, below.)215
In 1989, after court action requiring a programmatic review of its 
Biological Defense Research Program, the United States recorded a 
decision to continue the Program, stating that it “is in full compliance 
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with the Biological Weapons convention” and “does not include the 
development of any weapons, nor does it attempt to develop new 
pathogenic organisms for any use.”216
Figure 2.
 After learning of the contents of the NBACC briefi ng described 
above, three veteran observers of biological weapons issues authored 
a memorandum entitled “Biodefense Crosses the Line.”217 The three 
authors had no knowledge whatsoever of the 1999/Lederberg/CIA-
NAG experience. The memorandum argued four points:
 • That taken together, many of the activities itemized within 
the NBACC/BTCC research program—most particularly the 
“Store, Stabilize, Package, and Disperse” sequence and the 
“Computational modeling of feasibility, methods, and scale 
of production”—may constitute development in the guise of 
threat assessment. Development is prohibited by the Biological 
Weapons Convention.
 • That they very likely would be interpreted that way by at least 
some other states.
 • That U.S. intelligence agencies would judge a BW research 
program of this character and magnitude found in any other 
state to be an offensive BW program.
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 • That the program would stimulate analogous efforts in other 
states; in other words, the BW arms race that Tucker and 
Dando warned against. 
Individuals within the current administration have agreed with the 
third point in conversations among themselves.218
 The response to this critique of the NBACC/BTCC research 
program by an offi cial of the DHS in 2005 was a barely qualifi ed self-
incriminatory admission of the charge:
Homeland Security offi cials defend the biodefense program, saying that it 
will be as open as possible and will not breach the biowarfare agreement. 
But they concede that biodefense today, by necessity, requires stretching 
research boundaries beyond what would have been acceptable before the 
anthrax attacks. “If you have a bad guy who is trying to hurt you with 
a bioweapon, you have to understand how much material it will take 
to do harm, what kinds of packages he’ll use to keep it stable, how he 
might deliver it, and how effective it will be,” says Maureen McCarthy, 
director of the Offi ce of Research and Development in the Homeland 
Security Department’s science and technology division. “Those are hard 
questions. You can’t answer them in a vacuum.”219
There is no “vacuum;” Article 1 of the BWC fi lls that space. And one 
cannot “stretch” international treaties to which one is a state party. A 
recent report on NBACC prepared for Congress by the Congressional 
Research Service unfortunately includes no discussion of these 
issues.220
 On April 28, 2004, at the conclusion of a year’s review, the Bush 
administration disclosed details of the new National Biodefense 
Directive.221 Among them, reportedly, was that “the U.S. intelligence 
community is under orders to carry out studies examining the types 
of genetically engineered ‘bugs’ terrorists could be working on to 
mount an attack.”222 The intelligence community is not the place that 
such research should be carried out, if it should be carried out at all.223
Biodefense is the mission, all or in part, of a suffi cient number of other 
U.S. Government agencies and facilities, which are perfectly capable 




The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (DoD)
Naval Medical Research Institute (DoD)
DARPA (DoD)
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) (DoD)
DTRA (DoD)
Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories
Department of Agriculture
Environmental Protection Agency
and now, even the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
The CIA can obtain any information regarding biological agents that 
it needs in order to carry out its legitimate activities in the sphere of 
U.S. national security from these other U.S. agencies or organizations. 
Placing molecular genetics research under the jurisdiction of the 
intelligence community guarantees that there will be no independent 
oversight of it.
 In the last year or two, there have been a series of major national 
and international reports that have identifi ed lines of “dual use” 
molecular genetics research which are particularly problematical. 
In essence that means that they could be misused to develop more 
advanced biological weapons. Each of these reports suggests that such 
lines of research should be subject to particular and special formal 
oversight by one or another mechanism, much more oversight than 
presently exists anywhere. Although none of these explicitly engage 
the question of BWC treaty compliance, it is interesting to match the 
nine NBACC program elements quoted earlier with the research 
groupings in these reports. Two German researchers, Nixdorff and 
Bender, were the fi rst to produce a short compilation. In discussing 
“modifi cations of microorganisms that might have signifi cance for 
bioweapons, [they] identifi ed four classes of microbial manipulations 
that have been the subject of intense debate within and outside 
the scientifi c community: 1. The transfer of antibiotic resistance 
to microorganisms; 2. Modifi cation of the antigenic properties of 
microorganisms; 3. Modifi cation of the stability of microorganisms 
to the environment; and 4. The transfer of pathogenic properties to 
microorganisms.”224
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 A few months later, DoD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
convened a workshop to consider possible limitations on the 
publication of scientifi c research that “could be misused for biological 
warfare or terrorism.” It considered research that aims to achieve 
one or more of six weaponization-related goals.
 • Enhance pathogen infectivity, pathogenicity, antibiotic 
resistance, or resistance of host immunological defenses.
 • Improve the ability of a microbial pathogen to remain viable 
and virulent during prolonged storage and/or after release 
into the environment.
 • Facilitate the dissemination of biological agents as a fi ne-
particle aerosol.
 • Facilitate the dissemination of a biological agent by 
contamination of food or water sources.
 • Create a novel pathogen or one with characteristics that have 
been altered to evade current detection methods or host 
immune defenses.
 • Assemble oligonucleotides to synthesize the genome of a 
pathogenic microorganism.225
 The third compilation appeared in a 2004 report prepared by a 
Committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. The Committee 
identifi ed seven classes of experiments that it believes illustrate 
the types of endeavors or discoveries that will require review and 
discussion by informed members of the scientifi c and medical 
community before they are undertaken or, if carried out, before they 
are published in full detail. They include experiments that:
 • Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.
 • Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics 
or antiviral agents.
 • Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a 
nonpathogen virulent.
 • Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen.
 • Would alter the host range of a pathogen.
 • Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection 
modalities.
 • Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or 
toxin.226
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 In December 2004, a report of WHO included a relatively similar 
group of six:
 • Facilitate the production of toxins that were previously 
diffi cult to acquire on a large scale;
 • Make a pathogen resistant to the immune system or to 
antibiotic treatment, hence rendering defensive measures in 
effective;
 • Modify the environmental stability of a pathogen;
 • Create bacteria and viruses of greater virulence or render 
previously harmless organisms pathogenic;
 • Change host specifi city of microorganisms; or,
 • Render the identifi cation and detection of engineered 
pathogens very diffi cult (e.g., to bypass the current detection 
technologies).227
 A fi fth group of experimental categories were elaborated under 
a University of Maryland project aimed at designing a national 
and international mechanism for oversight of such work. It divides 
projects that would be considered “dangerous” into three groupings: 
extremely, moderately and potentially dangerous. (See Table 3 
below.)
 The overlap between the nine NBACC program elements quoted 
earlier and all of these fi ve lists is obvious. 
 On April 18, 2005, the DHS proposed to categorize the NBACC 
facility as a Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(FFRDC).228 Historically, a very large portion of the work carried out 
at FFRDCs, such as the Lincoln Laboratories, the Mitre Corporation, 
the Center for Naval Analysis, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the 
three U.S. Department of Energy laboratories (Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National 
Laboratory), the RAND Corporation (Air Force), and others is 
classifi ed. As of 2005, there are 37 FFRDCs altogether. In the words of 
a May 2005 Congressional Research Service report, “Many FFRDCs 
conduct research principally in classifi ed fi elds for the Defense and 
Intelligence Communities.”229 Whether the transformation of NBACC 
into a FFRDC will make oversight of its work signifi cantly more 
diffi cult than it would otherwise have been in any case, no one can 
say, but it probably can be assumed that it will. It is almost certain 
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Extremely Dangerous Activities (EDA):
 • Work with eradicated agent 
 • Work with agent requiring Biosafety Level-4
 • De novo synthesis of above
 • Expanding host range of disease agent to new host (in humans, other animals 
and plants) or changing the tissue range of a listed agent
 • Construction of antibiotic- or vaccine-resistant listed agent
Moderately Dangerous Activities (MDA):
 • Increasing virulence of listed agent or related agent
 • Insertion of host genes into listed agent or related agent
 • Increasing transmissibility or environmental stability of listed agent or related agent
 • Powder or aerosol production of listed agent or related agent
 • Powder or aerosol dispersal of listed agent or related agent
 • De novo synthesis of listed agent or related agent
 • Construction of antibiotic- or vaccine-resistant related agent
 • Genome transfer, genome replacement, or cellular reconstitution of listed agent 
or related agent 
Potentially Dangerous Activities (PDA):
 • Work with listed agent—or exempt avirulent, attenuated, or vaccine strain of select 
agent—not covered by EDA/MDA 
 • Increasing virulence of nonlisted agent
 • Increasing transmissibility or environmental stability of nonlisted agent
 • Powder or aerosol production of nonlisted agent 
 • Powder or aerosol dispersal of nonlisted agent 
 • De novo synthesis of nonlisted agent
 • Genome transfer, genome replacement, or cellular reconstitution of nonlisted agent
Defi nitions
Agent: fungus, protist, rickettsia, bacterium, virus, viroid, or prion; or genetic element, 
recombinant nucleic acid, or recombinant organism.
Listed agent: agent on CDC Select Agent list, USDA High-Consequence Livestock 
Pathogens list, or USDA/APHIS/PPQ Plant Pathogens list.
Related agent: for fungi, protists, rickettsiae, or bacteria, an agent in the same genus 
as a listed agent; for viruses, viroids, or prions, an agent in the same family as a listed 
agent; for genetic elements, recombinant nucleic acids, or recombinant organisms, an 
agent orthologous to a listed agent. (This category includes any avirulent, attenuated, 
or vaccine strain of a listed agent, if said strain is exempt under the CDC Select Agent 
list, USDA High-Consequence Livestock Pathogens list, or USDA/APHIS/PPQ Plant 
Pathogens list.)
Non-listed agent: agent other than a listed agent or related agent.
Antibiotic: antibiotic of therapeutic utility against listed agent.
Vaccine: vaccine of therapeutic utility against listed agent.
Powder: powder other than lyophilized reference specimen (<10 mg.)
Table 3. Groupings.230
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that all of the “threat assessment” research that it will undertake will 
be classifi ed.231 NBACC’s initial building cost is currently estimated 
at $128 million. In addition to NBACC, the DHS has now announced 
plans to build a National Bio and Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) at 
an initial projected building cost of $451 million. It would feature 
large animal BL-3 and BL-4 research capability in order to work with 
foreign animal diseases. The insertion of the NBAF into the DHS 
budget proposal was made by senior administration offi cials. In 
May 2005, the Army proposed a $1 billion expansion to USAMRIID 
to be built at the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort 
Detrick, Maryland.232 With inevitable cost overruns by the time 
these three new facilities will all be completed, the infrastructure 
investment for them will very likely exceed $2 billion. In addition, 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture is modernizing the National 
Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, at a cost of an additional $406 
million.233
 A new element, at least as problematic if not more so than the 
NBACC research program alone but certainly associated with it, is 
the newly announced wording by the DHS on the programmatic 
mission of NBACC. It clearly moves U.S. Government policy in 
the same—wrong—direction. The NBACC research program does 
so by implication; this does so in a more formal way. The DHS 
has apparently adopted and begun to publicly use its own novel 
interpretation of the provisions of Article 1 of the Biological Weapons 
Convention. In the FY 2006 Congressional Justifi cation for DHS, the 
DHS wrote the following in discussing NBACC:
The work in these laboratories will be for defensive purposes only. The 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), 
prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of 
offensive biological weapons. The U.S. is a signatory to this treaty, and 
all activities performed at the NBACC Facility will comply with this 
treaty and with all other applicable laws. [Emphasis added.]234
 The insertion of the single word “offensive” in front of “biological 
weapons” is a direct contradiction of all the rest of the statement and 
of all existing international legal interpretations of Article 1 of the 
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BWC. It implies that the BWC does not prohibit the development, 
production, and stockpiling of “defensive” biological weapons. But, 
the Biological Weapons Convention does not distinguish between 
“offensive” biological weapons, and any other kind. There is no such 
thing as “defensive” biological weapons. Whatever military doctrine 
may say regarding distinctions between offensive and defensive 
conventional weapons, this does not apply to biological weapons. 
Article 1.1 of the Biological Weapons Convention (see page 71) allows 
the growth of laboratory quantities of pathogens (agents) for defensive 
purposes, that is, in order to develop vaccines and pharmaceuticals, 
test rapid detection systems, masks, decontamination systems and so 
on. However even the “development” of the pathogen is explicitly 
forbidden – “never in any circumstances” – as is production and 
stockpiling. Article 1.2 is a blanket prohibition on the development 
and production of “weapons, equipment, or means of delivery 
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
confl ict.” The three qualifying words in Article 1.1 – prophylactic, 
protective, and peaceful – which operationally defi ne “defensive” 
in the treaty do not apply to “weapons, equipment, or means of 
delivery” in Article 1.2.
DHS’s choice of language in its FY2006 budget request was not 
an accident, but a deliberate, considered decision.235 The new DHS 
BWC treaty interpretation fi rst appeared in the September 17, 
2004, DHS submission for comments on the Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) for NBACC, and was repeated in the fi nal 
EIS released by DHS on December 23, 2004. In between the two 
submissions the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation 
in Washington, DC had questioned the DHS treaty interpretation, 
pointing out that in the 1989 Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement for the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program 
(CBDP), DoD states that the Biological Weapons Convention “makes 
the clear distinction between defensive and offensive efforts by 
identifying the development of biological weapons delivery systems 
as a discrete and prohibited activity.” In addition, U.S. statutory 
law, the 1989 implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons 
Convention [18U.S Code 175] makes no distinction between 
“offensive” and “defensive” biological weapons. DHS responded to 
these points by stating in its fi nal EIS that “the DoD’s programmatic 
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NEPA documentation cited has been superseded.” (NEPA refers 
to the National Environmental Policy Act, under which federal 
agencies are required to provide Environmental Impact Statements.) 
In essence, the formal DHS response in this instance was the same as 
the informal comment by DHS’s Maureen McArthy quoted earlier: 
that the times had changed. The DHS phrase about “superseded” 
brashly presumes to revoke the DoD legal commitments made in 
1989, and the interpretation of Article 1 of the BWC that the U.S. 
Government presumably held between 1972 and certainly at least 
until 1989, and as best as anyone knows until 2004. The times may 
very well have changed, but the provisions of the Biological Weapons 
Convention have not, and under international law, they are not open 
to being changed by unilateral interpretations.
 An analogous situation occurred some 20 years ago involving 
another arms control treaty. In the mid-1980s the Reagan 
administration attempted to reinterpret one of the provisions of 
the ABM Treaty through a memorandum—the so-called “Sofaer 
amendment”—written by Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the 
Department of State. It blandly stated that the United States could 
carry out a particular category of ABM testing which the ABM Treaty 
forbade. In that instance, the U.S. Senate took objection, stating that 
since it was the duty of the Senate to ratify international treaties, 
the Offi ce of the President had no authority to modify the terms of 
the treaty once it had been ratifi ed. Extensive Senate Hearings were 
held, and books and monographs were written on the subject.236
The USSR, the treaty cosignatory with the United States, also stated 
that it would not accept the suggested modifi cation or the activities, 
and that the integrity of other U.S.-USSR strategic arms limitation 
agreements would be placed in jeopardy if the United States 
unilaterally began the testing that it proposed to do. The Reagan 
administration ultimately withdrew its proposed unilateral treaty 
modifi cation. 
 These issues have certainly come to the attention of working 
level offi cials in the Foreign Ministries of at least some countries 
closely allied with the United States, but it is not known whether it 
has become a matter of private diplomatic discussion between those 
countries and the United States. Probably not. The subject has not 
been broached publicly. 
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 The entire area of oversight of problematical “dual use” research 
in molecular genetics and its applications in the United States appears 
to range from inadequate at local levels to virtually nonexistent at 
the national level and in terms of BWC treaty compliance.
 In the late 1970s, the NIH established a system applicable to any 
institution within the United States or overseas that receives any 
support from NIH for recombinant DNA research. That system 
required every such institution to establish an Institutional Biosafety 
Committee (IBC), and to register that IBC with the NIH Offi ce of 
Biotechnology Activities. The IBCs were then to oversee projects 
within their own institutions following a common set of guidelines 
and criteria. Failure to adhere to the NIH guidelines could result 
in the suspension, limitation, or termination of NIH funding for 
recombinant research. However, this system does not apply except 
on a voluntary basis to a very large population of institutions that 
are not recipients of NIH funding, such U.S. Government biodefense 
laboratories and U.S. Government contractors, as well as hundreds 
of commercial biotechnology enterprises. For example, the Battelle 
Memorial Institute, a government contractor which has been carrying 
out Project Jefferson at least since 2001, the development of a vaccine 
resistant strain of anthrax to duplicate Soviet-era work, apparently 
has no functioning IBC, although the research is by defi nition 
recombinant DNA work.237 The Departments of Energy, Defense, 
and Agriculture have numerous facilities carrying out recombinant 
DNA research at the same time as they have no NIH-registered IBCs. 
No one knows how much biodefense and bioterrorism research falls 
entirely outside the NIH guidelines and the IBC system. In addition, 
a recent study demonstrated that a very large proportion of the IBCs 
operated in haphazard fashion or not at all.238 Some three dozen 
commercial entities that do receive NIH funding for biodefense 
research had no IBC registered with the NIH at all. Finally, the 
existing NIH guidelines do not currently include consideration of 
the security or proliferation implications of dual-use research, and it 
is for that reason that the National Academy of Sciences committee 
recommended that the seven categories of experiments of concern be 
added to the NIH oversight process. 
 In response to the recommendations of the NAS committee 
report, the administration announced the establishment of a National 
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Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on March 4, 2004. 
Its mandate was to last for 2 years. The NSABB was established by 
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and is to 
be housed within the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The staff 
of the NSABB was not appointed until 11 months later in February 
2005. No announcement of the membership of the Board was made 
until its fi rst meeting on June 30, 2005. The responsibilities of the 
NSABB obviously were not seen as a signifi cant priority by the 
administration. A May 30, 2005, announcement stated that “The 
Board is charged with advising on the development of: guidelines 
for the oversight of dual-use research; national policies governing 
the publication and communication of sensitive research results 
. . .”239 The apparent notion was that the NSABB would oversee a 
process by which the National Academy committee’s suggestions 
regarding experiments of “dual use” concern would be grafted on to 
the IBC system. The NSABB will not itself review individual research 
project protocols; it will only respond to requests for guidance. That 
the local institutional committees would perform this much more 
substantive task, given their highly problematic record mentioned 
above in dealing with much less demanding considerations, seems 
dubious at best.240 A very similar opinion was expressed by the 
chairmen of six IBCs at major universities in the southeastern United 
States.241 But most importantly, the NSABB is to have no oversight 
over classifi ed BW-relevant research, which is the location in which 
the most problematical dual-use research is likely to take place. 
 As an example of the contradictory and counterproductive nature 
of even current NIH funding decisions, the NIAID at NIH recently 
announced a grant for a researcher hoping to develop a method of 
countering the action of botulinum toxin. The grant recipient, Dr. Kim 
Janda, noted that the task would be diffi cult because “the neurotoxin 
[is] quite unstable.” He would therefore be “collaborating with 
scientists in Wisconsin to develop a more stable form of the neurotoxin, 
one that is more easily studied.”242 The biological weapon programs 
of both the United States and the USSR discovered, independently, 
that botulinum toxin was not a very useful biological weapon because 
the toxin becomes unstable with increased purifi cation. Here was 
an NIH research award whose purpose was announced as “aimed 
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at stopping bioterrorism weapons” that was proposing to develop 
“a more stable form of the toxin” in order to carry out its research. 
However, that means preparing a much more effective botulinum 
toxin than had been available before, which had evaded preparation 
by the two largest offensive biological weapons programs in history, 
except in very small quantities.243
 Another example is the proposal that,
Better developed animal models and studies of the aerobiological 
properties of fi loviruses [Ebola and Marburg virus] need to be conducted—
which are critical to evaluating the threat posed by fi loviruses. . . . 
Without data, there can be little understanding of the level of threat 
that fi loviruses present. For example, it is not clear from the available 
data whether fi loviruses would cause large-scale infections and deaths 
if disseminated by aerosol over a city without extensive preparation or 
modifi cation (“weaponization”).244
This is a perfect example of research designed to probe a potential 
vulnerability, threat assessment in the absence of a verifi ed threat. 
As the authors clearly state in their paper, fi lovirus infection in 
nature does not occur via aerosol. The research therefore breaks new 
ground, and innumerable examples could be proposed all of which 
would, in effect, be pushing into areas that may not be justifi able. 
 It is clear that at the time of the three classifi ed biodefense projects 
in the 1999-2001 time period, there was no U.S. Government-wide 
NSC-interagency process to review the compatibility of all elements 
of the U.S. biodefense program with Article I of the BWC. Six years 
later, there still is none. Even existing mandated treaty compliance 
frameworks, such as within the U.S. DoD, to carry out reviews of 
BW R&D projects did not function in the case of its own classifi ed 
project in 1999-2001. DoD Directive Number 2060.1 mandated the 
establishment of DoD Compliance Review Groups (CRGs).245 An 
analogous directive existed in years prior to 2001. No CRG review 
of the DoD project (BACUS) ever took place.246 Whether one took 
place within the DIA, whose project it was, is unknown. Nor was 
information about the project ever brought to the attention of the 
National Security Council (NSC). 
 There is no functioning overall U.S. Government compliance 
oversight process today for research that impacts the BWC. DoD 
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continues to oppose the formation of such an NSC-level treaty 
compliance process.247 Others have suggested that a U.S. BWC 
compliance review process should be located in the National Academy 
of Sciences. That may additionally be desirable as a backstop, but 
it is a government function, and it belongs at the NSC level. With 
a second heavyweight Cabinet department, Homeland Security, 
reinterpreting the most critical provisions of the BWC, presumably 
to permit research that was heretofore considered out of bounds, the 
picture becomes problematical and dangerous.
 The cost of a U.S. BW research program that may cross into 
“development,” and of potential U.S. noncompliance with the BWC, 
very simply means the weakening of the BWC and the international 
regime that stands in the way of the proliferation of BW to new states 
or to nonstate actors/terrorist groups. That is certainly not something 
that anyone who wants such proliferation halted and reversed can 
possibly want to happen. On May 2, 2005, the U.S. Department of 
State released a Fact Sheet on “United States Initiatives to Prevent 
Proliferation.” It described seven unquestionably desirable U.S. 
Government programs. It did not, however, so much as mention 
any of the international nonproliferation treaty regimes: the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or 
the Biological Weapon Convention. This emphasis was repeated 
at the end of May in statements by President George W. Bush and 
Secretary of State Condolezza Rice on the occasion of the second 
anniversary of the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative. The current 
U.S. administration does not show much sympathy for international 
regimes. 
 It is sometimes said that criticism of the United States and its 
policies in regard to the BWC itself weakens the Convention, and 
serves to give other nations that may have no interest at all in 
observing its provisions a cover for their own misbehavior. There 
appears to be no way to address major issues without introducing 
such risk. Caution and reconsideration only rarely take place within 
the government, and if the trend appears to be a deteriorating one, 
the issues have to be raised publicly. Unfortunately, the United States 
also loses a portion of its leverage to raise questions about possible 





 A summary of the material presented in the appendix and the 
four subsequent sections of this monograph produces the following 
conclusions:
 • Signifi cance of the problem. “Bioterrorism” may or may not 
develop into a serious concern in the future, but it is not “one 
of the most pressing problems that we have on the planet 
today.”
 • The evolution of state biological weapons programs. The 
number of state BW programs has apparently been reduced 
by one-third or one-fourth in the past 15 years. The remaining 
number of countries appears to be stable; no compensating 
rise in offensive state BW programs has been identifi ed. In 
addition, the U.S. Government—which has almost without 
exception in past decades been the only country to publicly 
identify WMD proliferants—appears in its most recent 
statements to be qualifying the status of states with presumed 
offensive BW programs. To date, no state is known to have 
assisted any nonstate or terrorist group to obtain biological 
weapons.
 • The evolution of nonstate/terrorist biological weapon 
capabilities. The production and distribution of a dry powder 
anthrax product in the United States in 2001 is the most 
signifi cant event. However, understanding to what degree 
that demonstration of competence is relevant to “traditional” 
terrorist groups is impossible until the perpetrator(s) of the 
anthrax events are identifi ed. If it was done with assistance, 
materials, knowledge, access, etc., derived from the U.S. 
biodefense program, the implications change entirely.
   The Rajneesh group (1984) succeeded in culturing 
Salmonella. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group failed to 
obtain, produce, or disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin. 
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The steps taken by the al-Qaida group in efforts to develop 
a BW program were more advanced than the United 
States understood prior to its occupation of Afghanistan in 
November-December 2001. Nevertheless, publicly available 
information, including the somewhat ambiguous details that 
appeared in the March 31, 2005, report of the Commission 
on Intelligence Capabilities, indicates that the group failed 
to obtain and work with pathogens.  Should additional 
information become available regarding the extent to which 
the al-Qaida BW effort had progressed, that assessment might 
have to be changed.
   Scenarios for national BW exercises that posit various 
BW agents in advanced states of preparation in the hands 
of terrorist groups simply disregard the requirements in 
knowledge and practice that such groups would need in 
order to work with pathogens. Unfortunately, 10 years 
of widely broadcast public discussion has provided such 
groups, at least on a general level, with suggestions as to what 
paths to follow. If and when a nonstate terrorist group does 
successfully reach the stage of working with pathogens, there 
is every reason to believe that it will involve classical agents, 
without any molecular genetic modifi cations. Preparing a dry 
powder preparation is likely to prove diffi cult, and dispersion 
to produce mass casualties equally so. Making predictions on 
the basis of what competent professionals may fi nd “easy to 
do” has been a common error and continues to be so. The 
utilization of molecular genetic technology by such groups is 
still further off in time. No serious military threat assessment 
imputes to opponents capabilities that they do not have. There 
is no justifi cation for imputing to real world terrorist groups 
capabilities in the biological sciences that they do not posess.
 • Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public 
perceptions and policy prescriptions. For the past decade the 
risk and immanence of the use of biological agents by nonstate 
actors/terrorist organizations—“bioterrorism”—has been 
systematically and deliberately exaggerated. It became more 
so after the combination of the 9/11 events and the October-
November 2001 anthrax distribution in the United States that 
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followed immediately afterwards. U.S. Government offi cials 
worked hard to spread their view to other countries. An edifi ce 
of institutes, programs, conferences, and publicists has grown 
up which continue the exaggeration and scare-mongering. 
In the last year or two, the drumbeat had picked up. It may 
however become moderated by the more realistic assessment 
of the likelihood of the onset of a natural fl u pandemic, and the 
accompanying realization that the U.S. Government has been 
using the overwhelming proportion of its relevant resources 
to prepare for the wrong contingency.
   Others see exaggeration as necessary in order to prompt 
preparation. They acknowledge the exaggeration but argue 
that political action, the expenditure of public funds for 
bioterrorism prevention and response programs, will not 
occur without it. “Bioterrorism” may come someday if 
societies survive all their other impending crises. However, 
the persistent exaggeration is not benign: it is almost certainly 
the single greatest factor in provoking interest in BW among 
terrorist groups, to the degree that it currently exists, for 
example, in the al-Qaida organization. Precisely this occurred: 
Their most senior leadership was provoked by statements 
regarding bioterrorism and its supposed ease by U.S. offi cials 
in 1996-97.
 • Costs of the U.S. biodefense program. On the grounds of 
“necessity,” the U.S. biodefense research program appears to 
be drifting into violation of Article 1 of the BWC. There is little 
question but that U.S. offi cials would make that judgment of 
any other nation’s biodefense program in which the same 
kind of work was being carried out as is taking place and is 
planned by U.S. agencies, or in the case that agencies of another 
government put forward reinterpretations of the provisions 
of Article 1 of the BWC so as to imply that work could be 
done on “defensive” biological weapons. A national-level 
oversight system to see that BWC compliance is maintained 
by all projects of the U.S. biodefense program—unclassifi ed, 
classifi ed, and perhaps yet other “black” projects—does not 
exist. Should the BWC be weakened further and if other state 
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programs begin to go down the same research path as the 
U.S. biodefense program, together with any eventual recourse 
to BW by nonstate actors, the international regime against 
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